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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Environmental regulation in the United States has shifted sub-
stantially in recent years from near-exclusive reliance on direct regu-
latory prescription of mandatory rules of behavior to the use of a var-
ied basket of more flexible regulatory strategies. In some of these 
new arrangements, regulatory rules operate not as mandatory rules 
of behavior but as default rules that apply if, and only if, the regu-
lated party fails to make satisfactory alternative arrangements. This 
Article examines a specialized class of default rules—“regulatory 
penalty defaults”—that exhibit unique “information-forcing” and dis-
ciplining characteristics. The Article argues that such rules may 
prove especially useful in designing a new generation of environ-
mental measures that are more flexible than conventional command-
style rules, but do not sacrifice regulatory accountability.  
 First-generation environmental statutes empowered expert ad-
ministrative agencies to prescribe in detail the permissible means to 
achieve environmental objectives.1 This top-down, interventionist 
                                                                                                                      
 * Professor and Henry J. Fletcher Chair, University of Minnesota Law School. The 
author thanks Chuck Sabel, Joanne Scott, Bill Simon, participants in the conference on 
New Governance in the European Union and the United States held at the Cambridge 
University Law Faculty in July, 2004, and participants in the Florida State University Col-
lege of Law Symposium on Default Rules held in Tallahassee in March, 2005 for helpful 
comments on earlier drafts. The author also thanks Thomas Witt for invaluable research 
assistance. 
 1. See MARY GRAHAM, THE MORNING AFTER EARTH DAY: PRACTICAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLITICS 27-50 (1999). 
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approach, popularly known as “command-and-control regulation,” 
has been widely criticized. Rules of this type, it is said, are often both 
over- and underinclusive.2 They are often costly to implement, in-
flexible, insensitive to local variations in the economic costs and en-
vironmental benefits associated with achieving a specified level of 
environmental performance, and, in some circumstances, they may 
stifle innovation.3 
 Recent reform efforts have served up an array of innovative alter-
natives, including the following: 
 (1) Market-based or market-mimicking mechanisms, such as 
taxes, fees, and tradable permit systems.4 
 (2) Environmental contracting5 on facility-,6 firm-,7 or sector-
specific scales.8 
                                                                                                                      
 2. Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 791, 794 (1994) (stating that “the EPA cannot fully master the economics and 
technologies of dozens of industries” and consequently is “bound to make mistakes in both 
directions: asking more than some industries can reasonably achieve and letting others off 
too lightly”). 
 3. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1335-36 (1985) (criticizing command-and-control regulations as costly, 
inefficient, inflexible, and in some cases ineffective, imposing “disproportionate penalties 
on new products and processes,” creating “uncertainty and delay” in regulatory approvals 
for new plants, “discourag[ing] new investment,” and retarding the development of “new, 
environmentally superior strategies”).  
 4. See id. at 1348-49; Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Envi-
ronmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q.  1, 7-12 (1991) (dis-
cussing fees, permit trading, and other market incentive-oriented regulatory mechanisms). 
 5. See generally E. Donald Elliott, Toward Ecological Law and Policy, in THINKING 
ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 170, 183-85 (Marian R. 
Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997) (advocating a “command and covenant” system in 
which regulated parties contract around existing regulatory requirements); Eric W. Orts & 
Kurt Deketelaere, Introduction: Environmental Contracts and Regulatory Innovation, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATORY INNOVATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 1, 15-19 (Eric W. Orts & Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2001) 
[hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS] (discussing environmental contracting in the 
United States and Europe); Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
155, 191-97 (2000). 
 6. See, e.g., David A. Dana, The New “Contractarian” Paradigm in Environmental 
Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35, 36 (discussing “case-by-case, facility-by-facility, site-
by-site” contracting in which “regulators contractually commit not to enforce some re-
quirements . . . in return for the regulated entities’ contractual commitments to take 
measures not required under existing formal law”). 
 7. See, e.g., Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Community Empowerment and 
Regulatory Flexibility: EIPs and Accredited Licensing, in LEADERS AND LAGGARDS: NEXT-
GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 157 (2002) (describing the Australian state of 
Victoria’s Environmental Improvement Plan program, which encourages tripartite con-
tracting among firms, regulators, and community organizations to achieve voluntary envi-
ronmental performance improvements). 
 8. See, e.g., Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a New System of Environmental Regulation: 
The Case for an Industry Sector Approach, 26 ENVTL. L. 457 (1996) (urging a sector-based 
approach to environmental protection); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environ-
mental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 80-86 (2001) (describing widespread use of sec-
tor-specific “environmental covenants” or “voluntary agreements” in Europe and Japan). 
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 (3) Experiments in devolved, collaborative, “place-based” environ-
mental governance, such as integrated watershed management9 and 
ecosystem management.10  
 These varied reform initiatives proceed from the common assump-
tion that regulatory agencies have a limited capacity to gather and 
process relevant information, constraining their ability to specify en-
vironmentally effective and economically efficient rules.11 The alter-
native measures devolve important decisionmaking responsibilities 
to local actors presumed to be better situated to make particularized, 
context-sensitive decisions.12 
 Among these reform initiatives, market-mimicking strategies—
especially marketable permit or cap-and-trade systems—have re-
ceived a disproportionate share of scholarly attention. Less widely 
discussed, though arguably equally important, is the emergence of a 
“contractarian” paradigm13 in which regulated entities are invited to 
“contract around” otherwise applicable regulatory rules by bargain-
ing with regulators or, in some cases, regulatory beneficiaries.14 Of-
ten these bargains take the form of conditional waivers that trans-
form previously mandatory regulations into default rules defining 
the backdrop against which the parties bargain. 
 Experiments in collaborative place-based ecosystem management 
in places like the Chesapeake Bay and the Florida Everglades carry 
                                                                                                                      
 9. See, e.g., Jon Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management, 25 WM. 
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 379 (2000). 
 10. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, 
Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189 (2001); J.B. Ruhl, A Manifesto for the 
Radical Middle, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 385 (2002). 
 11. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 3, at 1336-37 (criticizing conventional regu-
lation for, inter alia, imposing burdens on centralized regulators to process large volumes 
of scientific and technical information); E. Donald Elliott, Environmental Markets and Be-
yond: Three Modest Proposals for the Future of Environmental Law, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 245, 
248 (2001) (stating that conventional command-and-control environmental regulation is 
“an inch wide and a mile deep,” reaching too few problems because of high information 
costs); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Per-
formance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 263-86 (2001). 
 12. Cf. Dana, supra note 6, at 37 (stating that regulators seek “decentralized and con-
textualized” solutions because the “complexity and variability” of environmental problems 
“make centralized, one-shoe-fits-all solutions clumsy, costly, and, in some instances, per-
haps unhelpful”); Daniel A. Farber, Triangulating the Future of Reinvention: Three Emerg-
ing Models of Environmental Protection, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 61 (identifying corporate self-
regulation, bilateral bargaining, and collaborative governance as the leading models of en-
vironmental reinvention). 
 13. See Dana, supra note 6; Orts & Deketelaere, supra note 5. 
 14. See Shi-Ling Hsu, A Game-Theoretic Approach to Regulatory Negotiation and a 
Framework for Empirical Analysis, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 33, 33 (2002) (stating that in-
creased reliance on conciliatory negotiation-oriented strategies coincides with increased 
skepticism about the effectiveness of top-down regulation); Jason Scott Johnston, The Law 
and Economics of Environmental Contracts, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS, supra note 5, 
at 271, 286 (describing environmental contracting against background status quo regula-
tion as a “default rule approach”). 
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this devolutionary thrust a step further. These initiatives feature lo-
cally or regionally based efforts at integrated management of an en-
tire suite of causally interconnected natural resources and environ-
mental stressors. Conventional natural resource and environmental 
programs have generally proceeded on a piecemeal basis, isolating 
and attempting to resolve discrete categories of problems through 
fixed uniform rules not calibrated to local circumstance. Because this 
fragmentary approach disregards both local variations in circum-
stance and the interconnectedness of the parts of the ecological sys-
tem, it often leads to regulatory gaps, inconsistencies, redundancies, 
counterproductive interventions, and over- and underregulation. In-
tegrated ecosystem management aims to address context-specific eco-
logical conditions and causally interconnected ecological processes. 
This typically demands a great deal of interagency, intergovernmen-
tal, and public-private coordination, collaboration, and information-
pooling, pitched at ecosystem-specific scales. The daunting complex-
ity of the undertaking militates in favor of epistemic humility and an 
open-ended, experimentalist management approach capable of re-
sponding to new learning and changing conditions. Participating sci-
entists and managers seek to deepen and continuously improve their 
understanding of the ecosystem through ongoing scientific investiga-
tion, ecological modeling, and monitoring, relying on “adaptive man-
agement” strategies that treat all management interventions as ines-
capably provisional and experimental, subject to reevaluation and 
revision in light of new learning.15  
 These hybrid, collaborative, public-private institutional configura-
tions are the leading example of “new governance” approaches in 
contemporary U.S. environmental regulation. Like the new govern-
ance approaches emerging in other domains of regulation and public 
service delivery in both the United States and Europe,16 they are 
“networked and multilevel,” with “decisionmaking processes that are 
neither hierarchical nor closed and that permit persons of different 
ranks, units, and even organizations to collaborate as circumstances 
demand.”17  
 Critics of these devolutionary and collaborative approaches argue 
that regulated parties will exploit opportunities to “game” the system 
through rent-seeking strategic bargaining; that powerful, self-
interested economic actors will dominate collaborative arrangements, 
                                                                                                                      
 15. See Karkkainen, supra note 10, at 200-04. 
 16. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Govern-
ance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 373-76 (2004); see also NEW 
GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EUROPE AND THE U.S. (Gráinne de Búrca & 
Joanne Scott eds., 2006). 
 17. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1019 (2004). 
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systematically skewing the results in their favor; and, that collabora-
tive deliberation will become mired in excessive transaction costs.18  
 This Article examines the potential role of regulatory penalty de-
fault rules as a mechanism to discipline and ensure accountability in 
these newly emerging institutional arrangements for collaborative, 
adaptive, integrated, place-based environmental governance. 
 Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner coined the term “penalty default” in 
the context of contract theory. Building on the insight that contract 
law consists largely of default rules designed to fill gaps in incom-
pletely specified contracts, Ayres and Gertner observed that, counter-
intuitively, some contract default rules appear to be “nonmajori-
tarian”—that is, they impose harsher default terms than the con-
tracting parties might prefer. To avoid these penalty default terms, 
parties will bargain around the default rule to reach explicit and pre-
sumptively less onerous contract terms.19 The penalty default ap-
proach, Ayres and Gertner suggested, might have especially salutary 
effects under circumstances of information asymmetry, where one 
party might otherwise have a strategic incentive to shift undisclosed 
risks to the other party. By creating a countervailing incentive to dis-
close this sort of information in the course of bargaining to explicit 
terms, penalty default rules exhibit an information-forcing character. 
 Following closely on the contract model, this Article argues that 
some regulatory rules operate as regulatory penalty defaults. Such 
rules impose harsh background regulatory requirements coupled 
with an opportunity for regulated parties to “bargain around” the de-
fault baseline by securing regulatory approval for alternative ar-
rangements. Ideally, the approval criteria would require that the 
                                                                                                                      
 18. See Cary Coglianese, Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis for Regulatory Policy?, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS, supra note 5, at 93 (arguing that negotiated decisionmaking 
processes tend toward least-common-denominator solutions, are time consuming and re-
source intensive, and may heighten underlying conflicts); David B. Spence & Lekha 
Gopalakrishnan, Bargaining Theory and Regulatory Reform: The Political Logic of Ineffi-
cient Regulation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 599, 625-31 (2000) (arguing that strategic bargaining is 
a major impediment to effective regulatory negotiation); Rena I. Steinzor, Regulatory Rein-
vention and Project XL: Does the Emperor Have Any Clothes?, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,527 
(1996); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey 
from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 141-43 (1998) (arguing that 
because collaborative decisionmaking is extremely complex and time consuming, it pre-
cludes meaningful participation by ordinary citizens and allows self-interested economic 
actors to dominate). 
 19. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91-93 (1989). 
Penalty defaults are designed to give at least one party to the contract an in-
centive to contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirma-
tively the contract provision they prefer. . . . [P]enalty defaults are purposefully 
set at what the parties would not want—in order to encourage the parties to 
reveal information to each other or to third parties . . . .  
Id. (emphasis added). 
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“bargained-for” alternative achieve environmental outcomes equal or 
superior to those promised by compliance with the default rule itself. 
Much like contract penalty default rules, regulatory penalty defaults 
can be both information-forcing and “action-forcing”—that is, they 
can induce the regulated entity to investigate, disclose, and ulti-
mately undertake affirmative self-regulatory measures that achieve 
public regulatory objectives more effectively and at less cost than 
might be achieved under conventional approaches.  
 Variants of the regulatory penalty default approach are widely 
used in U.S. environmental law and account for some of environ-
mental regulation’s most important policy successes. This Article dis-
cusses five extant examples. 
 Chuck Sabel and Bill Simon refer to a closely related type of disci-
plining rule as a “destabilization right.”20 Destabilization rights con-
sist of legal standards and mechanisms that allow interested parties 
to intervene and disentrench failing institutional arrangements.21 
Sabel and Simon advanced the concept of destabilization rights in 
the context of contemporary “public law litigation”—civil rights or 
civil liberties—based constitutional or statutory challenges to current 
institutional arrangements in such areas as public education, welfare 
programs, mental health services, prisons, policing policy, and so 
on.22 In these complex cases, they argue, courts have grown wary of 
imposing a detailed, comprehensive institutional reform blueprint on 
an unwilling governmental defendant—an approach Sabel and 
Simon characterize as the judicial equivalent of command-and-
control intervention.23 A more promising approach, they contend, is 
for the court to adopt a remedy that simply disentrenches the exist-
ing, failed institutional arrangement and sets out broad performance 
goals for its reconstructed successor, leaving the institutional design 
details to the defendant. To ensure accountability, however, the court 
retains jurisdiction and establishes mechanisms to monitor and 
evaluate the results, allowing subsequent readjustments as neces-
sary. Thus, instead of relying on the court to specify the new institu-
tional arrangements in detail—a task for which generalist judges are 
poorly equipped—the destabilization rights approach shifts the bur-
den to the defendant government to undertake the necessary institu-
tional reconstruction and to justify the results to the court’s satisfac-
tion. Frequently, Sabel and Simon contend, this process opens the 
door to new governance-style collaboration among all interested par-
                                                                                                                      
 20. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 17, at 1020.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. at 1021-53. 
 23. See id. at 1052. 
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ties in an open-ended, experimental process of institutional redesign, 
implementation, reevaluation and readjustment.24  
 This Article extends Sabel and Simon’s work in several ways. 
First, it argues that retention of an administrative (rather than a ju-
dicially enforceable) destabilization right by a central regulatory 
body can be a useful disciplinary and accountability mechanism, en-
suring that local experimentalist institutional configurations adhere 
to their commitments. A destabilization right retained by the regula-
tory center might also serve as a check on regulatory capture, strate-
gic bargaining, policy distortions resulting from asymmetric informa-
tion, and other procedural ills that critics contend are bound to infect 
collaborative new governance problem-solving institutions operating 
at local levels.25 
 Second, this Article argues that in U.S. environmental law, a type 
of destabilization right already exists in the form of the “citizen suit,” 
a ubiquitous feature of federal (and some state) environmental stat-
utes that allows interested citizens to seek judicial redress if regu-
lated parties or agency administrators violate applicable legal re-
quirements.26 Although most frequently used to compel enforcement 
of fixed regulatory standards and procedures, citizen suits can also 
operate as destabilization rights, forcing the disentrenchment and 
reconfiguration of underperforming institutional arrangements. Em-
ployed in this way, the citizen suit can perform a useful role in usher-
ing in opportunities for parties to initiate new governance ap-
proaches where conventional institutional arrangements have failed. 
 Finally, this Article argues that although the regulatory penalty de-
fault and destabilization rights concepts are distinct, they are closely 
related and merge at the boundaries. In particular, the background 
threat that either an administrative agency or an interested citizen 
might exercise a destabilization right can operate as a species of regu-
latory penalty default, inducing parties to undertake “voluntary” self-
regulatory measures to avoid that undesirable outcome. In collabora-
tive new governance settings, this mechanism might prove particu-
larly useful as a means of inducing ongoing cooperation among the col-
laborative partners, countering self-interested incentives to “defect” 
through strategic bargaining or uncooperative behaviors. 
                                                                                                                      
 24. See id. at 1016-21.  
 25. See Coglianese, supra note 18, passim (advancing a series of objections to collabo-
rative decisionmaking in the regulatory arena). 
 26. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 185 (characterizing citizen suit provisions as “a defining theme of 
the modern environmental era”). 
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II.   REGULATORY PENALTY DEFAULTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 The pioneering work of Ayres and Gertner in contract theory sug-
gested that penalty default rules can create powerful incentives for 
parties to bargain for explicit contract terms and in the process force 
disclosure of asymmetrically held information necessary to an effi-
cient contract.27 
 In contract theory, a penalty default rule is a gap-filling rule that 
intentionally imposes a harsh outcome on one or more parties, 
thereby creating an incentive to contract around the default rule in 
favor of an explicit alternative contract term.28 
 Ayres and Gertner argued that penalty default rules are espe-
cially appropriate in the context of information asymmetry, where 
the goal is to enhance efficient contracting by eliciting privately held 
information that one party might otherwise decline to reveal for stra-
tegic bargaining reasons.29 Their example-in-chief is Hadley v. Bax-
endale,30 a nineteenth century contract case in which a miller sued a 
shipper to recover the lost profits resulting from delayed shipment of 
a replacement crankshaft necessary to run the mill.31 The court ruled 
that consequential damages could not be recovered absent a showing 
that the defendant was aware of special circumstances that might 
give rise to such damages.32 This, Ayres and Gertner argued, is a 
penalty default rule.33 Although the miller (and other similarly situ-
ated parties) would prefer a rule allowing consequential damages for 
undisclosed risks, that rule would allow ultrasensitive parties to shift 
the risk to an unsuspecting shipper simply by remaining silent about 
their unusually large potential losses. Under the Hadley rule, ultra-
sensitive parties are penalized for nondisclosure. Consequently, they 
will either disclose to enable consequential damages under the Had-
ley default rule or bargain around the default rule to reach an ex-
plicit alternative contract damages term. In the course of that bar-
gaining, the shipper is almost certain to demand disclosure of the ex-
tent of its potential liability. Because penalty default rules create an 
incentive to disclose this somewhat asymmetrically held information, 
Ayres and Gertner described them as information-forcing.34  
                                                                                                                      
 27. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 19, at 91, 94, 97. 
 28. Id. at 91.  
 29. See id. at 91, 94, 97. 
 30. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Div.). 
 31. Id. at 146-47. 
 32. Id. at 151. 
 33. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 19, at 101. 
 34. See id. at 91-100. This builds on the earlier work of Charles Goetz and Robert 
Scott. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the 
Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1300 (1980). 
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 Unlike contract law, which consists primarily of interpretive or 
gap-filling default rules that apply in the absence of an explicit con-
tract term,35 environmental regulation typically starts from the 
premise that mandatory legal rules are required to alter the behavior 
of self-interested parties who otherwise would be inclined to exter-
nalize the environmental costs of their activities. Most environ-
mental rules tackle this challenge head on: a governmental authority 
issues an authoritative command that prescribes directly and in de-
tail the behavior that must be undertaken or avoided under pain of 
coercive sanctions for noncompliance.   
 In some cases, however, regulatory rules are designed to operate 
as default rules. Regulated entities have the option to avoid compli-
ance with these rules by “voluntarily” undertaking a self-initiated al-
ternative course of action that under specified conditions may be a 
satisfactory substitute for the otherwise applicable rule. Regulatory 
penalty default rules are a specialized subset of the broader category 
of regulatory default rules.36 A regulatory penalty default is a default 
rule that imposes harsh terms, creating an incentive for the regu-
lated party to voluntarily produce an acceptable alternative—in ef-
fect, to bargain around the otherwise applicable regulatory require-
ment. Like their contract cousins, regulatory penalty default rules 
are information-forcing: to secure agency approval for the proposed 
alternative, the regulated party tends to disclose information it 
asymmetrically holds.  
 Regulatory penalty default rules may also be information-forcing 
in the additional sense that they induce regulated parties to produce 
new information that may be required to construct the proposed al-
ternative and secure its approval. This feature is likely to be espe-
cially useful when the regulated party does not presently hold the 
desired information but is the party best situated to produce it—a 
common occurrence in environmental regulation.  
 Finally, regulatory penalty defaults—especially those that trigger 
at a future date if the regulated party fails to produce and obtain ap-
proval for an alternative in the interim—can have an action-forcing 
character: inducing the regulated party voluntarily to design and im-
                                                                                                                      
 35. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.10, at 37 (4th ed. 2004) (“[T]he great 
bulk of the general rules of contract law . . . are subject to contrary provision by the par-
ties.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 36. Ayres and Braithwaite were first to apply the penalty default concept to regula-
tion, but they left the concept largely undeveloped. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, 
RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 108-09 (1992) (urg-
ing a regulatory scheme based on contracting around either “majoritarian” or “penalty” de-
fault rules); see also Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and 
Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 315-16 & n.76 
(1999) (suggesting that the “interesting body of scholarship” on contract penalty defaults 
“might have some lessons for environmental law”). 
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plement an alternative plan to avoid complying with the undesired 
default requirement. 
 Despite the early predominance of mandatory command-and-
control approaches to environmental regulation, one can discern ex-
amples of the penalty default approach in a number of 1970s-era 
regulatory enactments (although none of them has operated under 
that rubric).37 In some cases, rules initially conceived as mandatory 
have been consciously reconfigured to operate as penalty default 
rules, in whole or in part. In other cases, regulatory programs have 
consciously incorporated penalty default strategies. Together, these 
categories encompass some of the most interesting and successful 
regulatory initiatives in U.S. environmental law to date. 
 In a recent article, I argued that the familiar environmental im-
pact statement (EIS) requirement of the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) has inadvertently evolved into a regulatory pen-
alty default scheme.38 NEPA imposes costly and dilatory procedural 
requirements on federal agencies, compelling production of a com-
prehensive EIS disclosing all reasonably foreseeable environmental 
impacts and a range of reasonably foreseeable alternatives before 
undertaking any action that would “significantly affect” environ-
mental quality.39 Agencies have learned to avoid the procedural 
“penalty,” however, by redesigning their proposals to include mitiga-
tion plans that reduce expected environmental impacts below the 
EIS-triggering threshold of “significant.”40 In effect, then, agencies 
bargain around the EIS requirement by identifying and agreeing to 
undertake alternative, self-regulatory, environmentally beneficial 
mitigation measures that plausibly satisfy the statutory threshold. 
 Other examples of regulatory penalty default rules embedded 
within conventional environmental regulation include the following: 
                                                                                                                      
 37. For example, wetlands permitting under the Clean Water Act imposes a default 
rule broadly prohibiting the discharge of dredged and fill material; however, if the appli-
cant provides evidence that there is no “practicable alternative” available and all “appro-
priate and practicable” steps are taken to reduce adverse impacts, the Act authorizes per-
mitting. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000) (forbidding “the discharge of any pollutant by any 
person” into waters of the United States); id. § 1344(a)-(b) (authorizing the issuance of per-
mits for the “discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified 
disposal sites” pursuant to regulatory guidelines); 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a), (d) (2002) (prohib-
iting discharge if there is a practicable alternative which would have a “less adverse im-
pact on the aquatic ecosystem” and prohibiting discharge unless steps are taken to “mini-
mize potential adverse impacts”). 
 38. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing 
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (2002). 
 39. Id. at 904-05. 
 40. See id. at 932-33. 
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 (1) RCRA’s “land ban,” an action-forcing “statutory hammer” that 
threatened draconian regulation of hazardous waste landfills unless 
the EPA developed alternative regulations by a certain date;41 
 (2) The Clean Air Act’s federal implementation plan (FIP) provi-
sion induces states to develop and implement comprehensive state 
implementation plans (SIPs) to achieve federal air quality standards 
and thereby avoid the adverse economic and political consequences 
that might follow if implementation planning is left to the federal 
EPA in default of state action;42 and 
 (3) The Endangered Species Act’s prohibition on adverse modifica-
tion of endangered species’ habitat regardless of the economic costs, a 
harsh requirement that landowners can avoid through proactive 
habitat conservation planning satisfactory to the U.S. Fish and Wild-
life Service.43 
 But the paradigmatic case of an information-forcing penalty de-
fault rule is California’s Proposition 65. 
III.   PENALTY DEFAULT RULES IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:        
FIVE EXAMPLES 
A.   Proposition 65 and the Uncertain Threat of Civil Liability 
 In 1986, California adopted a ballot initiative popularly known as 
Proposition 65, officially known as the Safe Drinking Water and 
Toxic Enforcement Act.44 Proposition 65 requires businesses to give 
“clear and reasonable warning” to anyone they expose to listed car-
cinogens and reproductive toxins.45 Failure to give adequate warning 
may result in stiff civil penalties enforceable by the attorney general 
or by citizen suit46 unless “the person responsible can show that the 
                                                                                                                      
 41. See 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (2000); Richard Ottinger, Strengthening of the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act in 1984: The Original Loopholes, the Amendments, and the Po-
litical Factors Behind Their Passage, 3 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 22 & n.146 (1985) (“They 
are called ‘hammer provisions’ by EPA staff because of their in terrorem effect.”). 
 42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7410(c), 7661 (2000).  
 43. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538-1539 (2000). 
 44. Proposition 65, Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5-.13 (West, Westlaw through ch. 17 of 2006 regular 
Sess. urgency legislation). Proposition 65 was written by environmental activists in 1985 
and adopted by voter initiative in November, 1986. Michael Barsa, Note, California’s 
Proposition 65 and the Limits of Information Economics, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1223, 1223-24 
(1997). 
 45. § 25249.6 (“No person in the course of doing business shall knowingly and inten-
tionally expose any individual to a chemical known to the state to cause cancer or repro-
ductive toxicity without first giving clear and reasonable warning to such individual . . . .”). 
Businesses with fewer than ten employees are exempt. Id. § 25249.11(b). 
 46. Id. § 25249.7(b)-(d) (stating that a violation is subject to civil penalty of up to 
$2500 per day for each violation, and action may be brought by attorney general, district 
attorney, city prosecutor, or “any person in the public interest”). 
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exposure poses no significant risk.”47 Implementing regulations de-
fine “significant risk” for carcinogens as a one-in-100,000 risk of can-
cer, assuming a lifetime of exposure.48  
 The effect of Proposition 65, then, is to place the burden on busi-
nesses to determine when exposures above a minimum risk threshold 
may occur, and it requires businesses to warn those likely to be ex-
posed or, alternatively, to take preventive action to reduce exposures 
below the actionable risk threshold.49 This reverses the usual regula-
tory presumption that chemical releases and exposures are permissi-
ble unless a regulation specifically provides otherwise. It also shifts 
the burden of producing the information needed to determine 
whether a particular level of emissions is permissible from the regu-
latory agency to the regulated industry. 
 Most commentary on Proposition 65 focuses on the ubiquitous 
warning labels it generates—whether these warnings are an effective 
and responsible means of informing the public of toxic hazards and 
whether such warnings create the proper incentives for businesses to 
reduce toxic exposures to optimal levels.50 The evidence suggests that 
Proposition 65 warning labels affixed to consumer products have 
prompted consumers to avoid some products labeled hazardous, lead-
ing product manufacturers to alter some product formulations.51 
 The effects of Proposition 65 warnings on environmental exposures 
are murkier, however. Environmental exposure warnings typically con-
sist of newspaper advertisements, mass mailings to affected communi-
ties, or signs posted at the fence line of a polluting facility.52 The effec-
tiveness of these means of communicating environmental risk is ques-
tionable.53 Yet, many observers credit Proposition 65 with playing a sig-
nificant role in reducing environmental releases of listed pollutants.54  
                                                                                                                      
 47. Id. § 25249.10(c). 
 48. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 12703(b) (2006) (providing that “no significant risk” is 
generally a level “calculated to result in one excess case of cancer in an exposed population 
of 100,000, assuming lifetime exposure at the level in question”). 
 49. See Barsa, supra note 44, at 1224, 1240-42 (describing actions by manufacturers 
to eliminate listed substances from products and environmental releases to avoid Proposi-
tion 65 warnings). 
 50. See, e.g., id. at 1224; Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: Evaluating 
Warnings Under California’s Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303, 321-55 (1996). 
 51. See Clifford Rechtschaffen, How to Reduce Lead Exposures with One Simple Stat-
ute: The Experience of Proposition 65, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,581, 10,582-91 (1999) (stating 
that manufacturers removed lead from faucets, ceramics, crystal glassware, foil caps on 
wine bottles, and other consumer products to avoid Proposition 65 warning requirements); 
Rechtschaffen, supra note 50, at 341-48; Randolph B. Smith, California Spurs Reformu-
lated Products, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1990, at B1 (describing Proposition 65’s national im-
pact as manufacturers reformulate products to avoid its labeling requirements). 
 52. Rechtschaffen, supra note 50, at 333-34. 
 53. See id. at 320-59. 
 54. See Barsa, supra note 44, at 1226 (summarizing the evidence and discussing con-
founding factors, such as the effects of the federal Toxics Release Inventory, conventional 
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 One explanation for this seemingly anomalous result is that in the 
environmental pollution context warnings appear to do little of the 
actual work. Instead, legal uncertainty concerning the adequacy of 
warnings drives toxic polluters. 
 Because environmental exposure pathways may be difficult to 
trace, the manager of a polluting facility may be uncertain about who 
is exposed, the level of exposure, the size of the exposed area, and the 
best method to communicate warnings to the entire class of exposed 
persons within that area. The statute demands “clear and reason-
able” warnings to all exposed persons, but it does not define what 
constitutes clear and reasonable warning. Implementing regulations 
authorize a variety of methods for warning of environmental expo-
sures: warning signs “in the affected area,” public media advertise-
ments “which target the affected area,” and mass mailings to “occu-
pant[s] in the affected area.”55 But the polluter must determine the 
“affected area” and choose the “most appropriate” of these methods 
under the circumstances, and the warning must be provided “in a 
conspicuous manner and under such conditions as to make it likely to 
be read, seen or heard and understood by an ordinary individual in 
the course of normal daily activity.”56  
 These highly indefinite standards leave ample room for case-by-
case litigation over the adequacy of any particular warning. Polluters 
relying on newspaper advertisements and mass mailings, for exam-
ple, have faced legal challenges arguing that their warnings reached 
an insufficient number of people or targeted the wrong communi-
ties.57 Under California law, these are questions of fact for jury de-
termination.58 
 In principle, toxic polluters can avoid these warning requirements 
if they reduce pollution below the “no significant risk” exposure 
threshold.59 However, the complex risk assessments necessary to de-
                                                                                                                      
regulatory standards, industrial self-regulation, and changing norms of environmental 
stewardship); David Roe, Toxic Chemical Control Policy: Three Unabsorbed Facts, 32 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,232, 10,232 (2002) (crediting Proposition 65 with an eighty-five percent 
reduction in air emissions of carcinogens from 1988 to 1997, in comparison with a fifty per-
cent decline nationally). 
 55. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 12601(1)(C)-(D) (2006). 
 56. Id. § 12601(d)(2). 
 57. See Michael Freund, Proposition 65 Enforcement: Reducing Lead Emissions in 
California, 10 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 345-59 (1997) (describing cases in which plaintiffs 
successfully challenged adequacy of warnings of environmental exposures, including warn-
ings by posting at plant gates, newspaper publication, and mass mailings). 
 58. See Ingredient Commc’n Council, Inc. v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216, 219 n.3 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11,346.7). 
 59. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25,249.10(c) (West, Westlaw through ch. 17 of 
2006 regular Sess. urgency legislation) (exempting from the warning requirement any “ex-
posure for which the person responsible can show that the exposure poses no significant 
risk assuming lifetime exposure at the level in question”). 
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termine whether pollution exceeds this threshold often lie beyond the 
scientific and technical capabilities of the ordinary polluting facility. 
Moreover, given the scientific uncertainties surrounding toxic risks, 
risk assessments are open to dispute and legal challenge. In addition, 
California law holds that in a lawsuit based on alleged failure to 
warn, the burden of proving no significant risk lies with the defen-
dant60 who must demonstrate that the exposure “poses no significant 
risk . . . based on evidence and standards of comparable scientific va-
lidity to the evidence and standards which form the scientific basis 
for the listing of such chemical.”61 As Proposition 65 co-author David 
Roe explains, “Scientific uncertainty results in legal uncertainty for 
private industry.”62  
 Just when things look bleakest from the toxic polluter’s perspec-
tive, however, Proposition 65 throws out a lifeline. It authorizes (but 
does not require) a regulatory agency, the Office of Environmental 
Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA), to establish numerical expo-
sure standards that will be deemed to meet the no significant risk 
test.63 By voluntarily meeting these numerical standards, toxic pol-
luters can avoid the duty to warn and inoculate themselves against 
liability for failure to warn adequately. However, OEHHA must first 
promulgate the numerical standards. This gives toxic polluters in 
California an unusual incentive to cooperate with state regulators in 
setting, justifying, and defending numerical regulatory standards 
and to produce and disclose as much credible toxicity and exposure 
information necessary to enable regulators to implement these regu-
latory standards.64 Under Proposition 65, California has managed to 
establish nearly three hundred regulatory standards for toxic pollut-
ants, operating at a far faster pace and lower administrative cost 
than conventional regulatory approaches, in large measure due to 
                                                                                                                      
 60. See Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 641-42 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2001) (In a Proposition 65 suit for failure to warn, the burden is on defendant to prove 
affirmative defense of “no significant risk” even if plaintiff offers no evidence of health risk 
at expected exposure levels.). In SmileCare, plaintiffs sued dentists for failure to warn pa-
tients that amalgam fillings contained mercury, a listed carcinogen. Id. at 636. Although 
the plaintiffs produced no evidence that these exposures were medically harmful, the court 
ruled that the mere allegation of failure to warn shifted the burden to the defendants to 
prove “no significant risk.” Id. at 637-38. 
 61. See § 25,249.10(c). 
 62. Roe, supra note 54, at 10,235.  
 63. See § 25,249.12 (authorizing state agencies broadly to adopt implementing regula-
tions); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, §§ 12,701-,711 (authorizing regulatory adoption of No Sig-
nificant Risk Levels (NSRLs) for carcinogens at numerical exposure thresholds deemed to 
pose no significant risk); id. §§ 12,801-,805 (authorizing regulatory adoption of No Observ-
able Effect Levels (NOELs) for reproductive toxins). 
 64. See Roe, supra note 54, at 10,235-36. 
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the extraordinary degree to which California industries have cooper-
ated in the standard-setting process.65 
 Proposition 65 uses a creative penalty default approach to ad-
vance environmental regulation. Under conventional approaches, the 
regulatory agency bears the burden of producing the information 
necessary to justify regulation, and polluters have a perverse incen-
tive not to produce or reveal toxicity and exposure information that 
might lead to regulation.66 Proposition 65 reverses the incentive, 
adopting a background rule intentionally designed to be unpalatable 
to polluters—specifically, a broad and indefinite duty to warn cou-
pled with stiff liability for breach of that duty. Against this harsh 
backdrop of uncertain and potentially large-scale liability, Proposi-
tion 65 invites polluters to contract around the penalty provision by 
cooperating with regulators: first, by revealing (and if necessary by 
generating) information needed to establish health-protective nu-
merical regulatory standards, and then by voluntarily reducing 
emissions below the established numerical thresholds. The Proposi-
tion 65 penalty default rule thus exhibits both an information-forcing 
and an action-forcing character. 
 Critics in California and elsewhere argue that Proposition 65 is 
too draconian and contrary to initial expectations; moreover, it has 
spawned few imitators elsewhere.67 A detailed assessment of the 
merits and faults of Proposition 65 is beyond the scope of this Article, 
but whatever its merits, Proposition 65 illustrates a creative and 
powerful application of the regulatory penalty default mechanism. 
B.   Reinterpreting Mandatory Rules as Penalty Defaults: The  
Endangered Species Act’s Prohibition as Penalty Default 
 Recognizing the burdens placed on regulated entities by command-
and-control regulation, some agencies have sought to reconfigure con-
                                                                                                                      
 65. See id. at 10,235; John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Informa-
tion, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 309-10 & 
n.263 (1991); Barsa, supra note 44, at 1240 (stating that under Proposition 65’s nearly 300 
regulatory standards have been set “without [triggering] a single legal challenge,” prompt-
ing a review panel to declare that “ ‘by federal standards, Proposition 65 has resulted in 
100 years of progress in the areas of hazard identification, risk assessment and exposure 
assessment’ ” (quoting Jessica Mathews, An Opening for Environmentalists, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 16, 1996, at A15)). 
 66. See Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing 
Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1814-15, 1819 (1989). 
 67. See Paulette L. Stenzel, Right-to-Know Provisions of California’s Proposition 65: 
The Naivete of the Delaney Clause Revisited, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 493, 494 & n.8 
(1991) (indicating early hopes of Proposition 65’s backers that the approach would be 
adopted in other states); Richard A. Lovett, Prop 65’s Non-Toxic Legacy, SACRAMENTO BEE, 
Nov. 30, 1997, at F1 (presenting criticisms that Proposition 65 is too inflexible and strin-
gent and reporting failed efforts to enact similar bills in Ohio, New York, Massachusetts, 
Illinois, and Texas). 
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ventional rules into penalty defaults. Broadly speaking, these are a 
subset of what Dan Farber calls “positive slippage”: a divergence be-
tween the nominal requirements of a regulatory provision and actual 
practice, when such divergence is authorized by the regulatory agency 
itself in pursuit of more effective or cost-efficient regulation.68 
 One of the boldest efforts to reconfigure conventional environ-
mental regulation into a penalty default regime was the Department 
of the Interior’s aggressive expansion of Habitat Conservation Plans 
(HCPs) during Bruce Babbitt’s tenure as Secretary of the Interior 
under the Clinton Administration. Babbitt took a previously obscure 
and rarely used waiver provision, section 10(a) of the Endangered 
Species Act of 1973 (ESA), and transformed it into the centerpiece of 
his endangered species and ecosystem conservation policy.69  
 Section 9 of the ESA famously prohibits the “take” of listed species 
of fish and wildlife.70 The statutory definition of take includes 
“harm,”71 and by regulation, harm includes adverse habitat modifica-
tion that disrupts essential behaviors.72 The result can be a blanket 
prohibition on economically valuable but habitat-modifying activities, 
such as forestry and urban development on privately held lands 
where endangered species occur.73 
 The statute was amended in 1982 to create an escape hatch for 
landowners caught in the grip of this sweeping prohibition. The pres-
ence of listed species of butterflies had barred developers from build-
ing housing on San Bruno Mountain, one of the last remaining unde-
veloped areas on the San Mateo peninsula immediately south of San 
Francisco.74 Seeking a mutually beneficial compromise, the develop-
ers offered to scale back the acreage of the proposed development, 
                                                                                                                      
 68. Farber, supra note 36, at 299-306 (defining “positive slippage” and noting in pass-
ing that some cases of “affirmative slippage” involve penalty default rules). 
 69. J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management: Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. 
& TECH. 21, 41-42 (2005) (describing how Babbitt revived a moribund HCP program and 
turned it into an expansive vehicle for ecosystem-based species protection and increased 
flexibility for landowners).    
 70. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2000) (making it unlawful for any person to “take” any spe-
cies of fish or wildlife listed as “endangered”); 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (2005) (extending, by regu-
lation, statutory prohibition on “take” to fish and wildlife species listed as “threatened”). 
 71. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (defining “take” to include “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, 
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct”). 
 72. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3(c)(3) (defining “harm” to include “significant habitat modification 
or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essen-
tial behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering”); see also Babbitt v. 
Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697 (1997) (upholding habi-
tat modification rule as a reasonable agency interpretation of the statutory term “take”). 
 73. The Fish & Wildlife Service’s limited monitoring and enforcement capabilities 
probably allow many violations to proceed undetected and undeterred, however. See Dana, 
supra note 6, at 38-39 (describing the ESA as “underinclusive and underenforced”); Hsu, 
supra note 14, at 58-61. 
 74. Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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dedicate most of the remaining undeveloped land as a habitat re-
serve, undertake affirmative enhancements to the (somewhat de-
graded) butterfly habitat by removing invasive vegetation, replanting 
native species upon which the butterflies were dependent, and fund 
an ongoing habitat management program.75 This approach, they ar-
gued, would trade off small reductions in habitat acreage for signifi-
cant improvements in habitat quality, potentially leaving the butter-
flies better off than under the “hands-off,” no-modification rule.76 
 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) accepted the logic of 
this proposal but said it had no legal authority to strike such a deal.77 
To break the impasse, Congress amended the statute, adding a new 
section, 10(a), authorizing the FWS to issue permits for the “inciden-
tal take” of a listed species provided it would not “appreciably re-
duce” the species’ prospects for survival and recovery in the wild.78 
The new section provided further that the applicant submit and win 
regulatory approval for a habitat conservation plan designed to 
“mitigate and minimize” adverse impacts on protected species.79  
 In enacting section 10(a), Congress anticipated that similar “win-
win” opportunities to exchange minor variances from the blanket 
“no-take” rule for enhanced species protection would arise in the fu-
ture.80 For many years, however, landowners rarely invoked the sec-
tion 10(a) waiver provision. Most landowners found that the cost of 
producing a habitat conservation plan outweighed the expected bene-
fits, especially given the uncertain prospects of securing an inciden-
tal take permit under the indefinite and highly discretionary stan-
dards provided in the statute.81 In addition, a history of spotty sec-
                                                                                                                      
 75. Id. at 980-82. 
 76. Id. at 982-83; Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Conserving Habitats and Building 
Habitats: The Emerging Impact of the Endangered Species Act on Land Use Development, 
10 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 20-21 (1991) (stating that the two-year biological study commis-
sioned by the San Bruno Mountain Steering Committee concluded that the butterfly habi-
tat would be lost even if no development occurred). 
 77. See Graham M. Lyons, Habitat Conservation Plans: Restoring the Promise of Con-
struction, 23 ENVIRONS 83, 90 (1999) (stating that the HCP could not be implemented with-
out a section 9 amendment authorizing such agreements). 
 78. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2000). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See S. REP NO. 97-418, at 10 (1982). The Senate Committee Report states:  
  In some cases, the overall effect of a project [approved under § 10(a)] can be 
beneficial to a species, even though some incidental taking may occur. An ex-
ample is the development of some 3000 dwelling units on the San Bruno Moun-
tains near San Francisco. . . . Absent the development of this project these but-
terfly recovery actions may well have never been developed. 
Id.  
 81. See Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning: Addressing the Achilles 
Heel of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 279, 301-10 (1998). Under section 
10(a), incidental take permits are not available “as of right,” but instead are discretionary. 
See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2000) (noting the Secretary may issue an incidental take permit 
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tion 9 enforcement tended to undercut any incentive landowners 
might have to seek formal permits for activities that, if pursued qui-
etly, were unlikely to trigger FWS scrutiny anyway.82 
 Then along came Bruce Babbitt and the California gnatcatcher, a 
small and rather ordinary-looking songbird, a denizen of the south-
ern California coastal sage scrub habitat that was rapidly vanishing 
into urban sprawl.83 Listing the gnatcatcher under the ESA would 
threaten development across a broad swath of fast-growing San 
Diego, Orange, and Riverside Counties, at huge cost to landowners, 
developers, and local governments.84 Babbitt correctly calculated that 
listing the bird would force southern California to seek alternatives 
to sprawl and would possibly forestall threats to other coastal sage-
dependent species. Faced with the threat of ESA enforcement, land-
owners and developers joined with state and local officials, conserva-
tionists, and federal agents to devise ambitious regional multiparty, 
multispecies conservation plans.85 The plans set aside thousands of 
acres of core habitat reserves and rewrote local land use regulations 
to restrict development on the reserves’ periphery to prevent adverse 
spillover effects in the core reserves.86 
 From that point forward, HCPs became a showcase of Clinton-era 
regulatory reinvention. More than 360 HCPs covering 30 million 
acres were negotiated by September 2001.87 This process transformed 
the ESA’s no-take rule from an inflexible, uniform, and draconian 
mandatory rule into a penalty default rule around which landowners 
and other affected parties may bargain for locally tailored solutions. 
To secure regulatory approval, regulated parties must produce and 
disclose detailed information on land characteristics, species counts, 
                                                                                                                      
provided the applicant meets all statutory requirements and “such other measures that the 
Secretary may require”).  
 82. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty 
Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 972 (2003). 
 83. Id. at 973-74 
 84. See generally Marc J. Ebbin, Is the Southern California Approach to Conservation 
Succeeding?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695, 702 (1997) (describing the potential for a “showdown” 
between economic interests and environmentalists as a consequence of listing California 
gnatcatcher). 
 85.  Technically, the Orange and San Diego County plans did not arise under section 
10(a), but instead under section 4(d), which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to 
promulgate special rules for the protection of “threatened” species. However, by avoiding 
an otherwise applicable default regulation subjecting “threatened” species to the section 9 
“no-take” provision in the absence of a species-specific rule, the special section 4(d) rule for 
the gnatcatcher operates as the functional equivalent of a section 10(a) incidental take 
permit and HCP. See Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation 
from Pollution Control Law: Cooperative Federalism for Recovery Under the Endangered 
Species Act, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 94-109 (2002). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR HABITAT 
CONSERVATION PLANS AND THE INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMITTING PROCESS 1 (2001), 
http://training.fws.gov/EC/Resources/HCP/HCP/HCPs-and-Incidental-Take.pdf. 
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habitat requirements, vegetation types, and environmental stressors. 
On the basis of such information, they must also develop and imple-
ment location-specific affirmative conservation measures at a level of 
contextual detail that is almost certainly impossible to achieve 
through top-down regulatory prescription. 
 In contrast to Proposition 65, the de facto penalty default rule in 
the HCP context was not a rule initially designed to function as a 
penalty or as a default rule. Instead, section 9 was intended as a 
mandatory rule. But the rule turned out to have such harsh conse-
quences that it could be easily converted to a penalty default rule by 
exploiting an obscure waiver provision. The default position some-
times imposes unacceptably high costs or can be made to do so by the 
strategic exercise of governmental authority—in this case, the ESA 
listing determination. In the southern California case, some land-
owners complained that the voluntary, or cooperative, process of ne-
gotiating a binding regional land use plan consistent with habitat 
protection looked, from their vantage point, suspiciously like extor-
tion, and it must be acknowledged that the line between principled 
application of a penalty default strategy and outright regulatory ex-
tortion is a fine one. 
C.   Accidental Penalty Defaults: NEPA and the Burden of Procedure 
 The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is one of oldest, 
most venerated, and most reviled of the major federal environmental 
statutes. It is also one of the most misunderstood. Much of the aca-
demic commentary surrounding NEPA concerns the effectiveness (or 
lack thereof) of the environmental impact statement (EIS), the ency-
clopedic compendium of expected impacts and alternatives that a fed-
eral agency must produce before undertaking any action that signifi-
cantly affects the environment.88 In all but the extreme cases, how-
ever, federal agencies can avoid NEPA’s EIS production requirements 
by redefining projects or adding mitigation measures to keep the ex-
pected environmental impacts of proposed actions below the triggering 
threshold for EIS production.89 This is the phenomenon known as the 
“mitigated FONSI” (Finding of No Significant Impact).90 
                                                                                                                      
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i)-(iii) (2000) (requiring all federal agencies to “include in every 
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the re-
sponsible official on the environmental impact[s]” and “alternatives to the proposed action”). 
 89. See Karkkainen, supra note 38, at 908. 
 90. See generally Mitigation and Mitigated Findings of No Significant Impact, 
APHIS, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ppd/es/g17.html. Mitigation methods or measures are 
recommended for the purpose of avoiding, reducing, or rectifying environmental impact. 40 
C.F.R. § 1508.20 (2005).  
Mitigation measures may be relied upon to prepare a FONSI only if they are 
imposed by statute or regulation, or submitted by an applicant or agency as 
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 A mitigated FONSI allows the agency to avoid triggering a full-
scale EIS by redefining its proposed project to include mitigation 
measures and then conducting a scaled-down inquiry—known as an 
environmental assessment (EA)—that leads to a formal finding that 
the mitigated project will have “no significant impact” on the envi-
ronment. The courts have upheld the use of mitigated FONSIs,91 and 
their popularity with agency managers suggests that the mitigation 
measures needed to justify the FONSI generally prove less costly to 
the agency than the lengthy and cumbersome EIS process.92 
 Detailed information on the number and kinds of mitigated FON-
SIs produced annually is unavailable because agencies are not re-
quired to report EAs and FONSIs to a centralized information source 
(and in some cases regional offices are not even required to report 
them to agency headquarters), but a 1993 survey of federal agencies 
concluded that “agencies appear to rely heavily on mitigation meas-
ures to justify EAs and . . . findings of no significant impact (FON-
SIs).”93 Mitigated FONSIs most likely represent a large fraction of 
the 50,000 or so FONSIs produced annually.94 
 Environmentalists and some legal scholars regard the mitigated 
FONSI as a dodgy means of avoiding NEPA’s information production 
and disclosure requirements.95 It is reasonable to assume that pro-
                                                                                                                     
part of the original proposal. As a general rule, the regulations contemplate 
that agencies should use a broad approach in defining significance and should 
not rely on the possibility of mitigation as an excuse to avoid the EIS require-
ment. A “mitigated FONSI” is based upon mitigations that are enforceable 
through the record of decision. The integration of mitigation measures into 
these environmental documents is required from the beginning. 
Mitigation and Mitigated Findings of No Significant Impact, supra  (citation omitted). 
 91. As the D.C. Circuit explained:  
[A]n EIS must be prepared only when significant environmental impacts will 
occur as a result of the proposed action. If, however, the proposal is modified 
prior to implementation by adding specific mitigation measures which com-
pletely compensate for any possible adverse environmental impacts stemming 
from the original proposal, the statutory threshold of significant environmental 
effects is not crossed and an EIS is not required. 
Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  
 92. Albert I. Herson, Project Mitigation Revisited: Most Courts Approve Findings of 
No Significant Impact Justified by Mitigation, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 51, 69 (1986) (stating that 
agencies “know that the EIS process involves considerably more expense and delay than 
the” simpler EA/mitigated FONSI procedure). Cost differential is the principal motivation 
for agencies to choose mitigated FONSIs over EISs. Id. at 68-69.  
 93. Elisabeth A. Blaug, Use of the Environmental Assessment by Federal Agencies in 
NEPA Implementation, 15 ENVTL. PROF. 57, 57 (1993). Some agencies say they rarely or 
never use mitigated FONSIs, while others use them frequently. According to Blaug, “Nine 
agencies stated that 11 percent to 50 percent of their EAs result in mitigated FONSIs,” one 
said a “majority,” one said eighty percent, and one said ninety-five percent. Id. at 59. 
 94. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY 
OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 19 (1997), http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/ 
nepa25fn.pdf. 
 95. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 893-94 (2d ed. 1994) 
(“[T]here always has been something suspiciously circular about the practice of mitigated 
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jects proceeding under mitigated FONSIs start out above, or very 
near, the statutory threshold of significant environmental impacts—
otherwise, the agency could avoid an EIS through an ordinary un-
mitigated FONSI. In that terrain, NEPA normally requires an EIS to 
ensure fully informed decisionmaking.96 Because the mitigation plan 
is developed without the benefit of an EIS, however, it raises con-
cerns that the agency is proceeding with only partial information and 
that its mitigation strategy may not be based on consideration of the 
full range of environmental impacts and mitigation alternatives.97  
 Nonetheless, the mitigated FONSI arguably operates as a simpli-
fied means to advance NEPA’s core objective of improving the gov-
ernment’s environmental performance.98 In a mitigated FONSI, the 
agency attempts to identify the most important expected environ-
mental impacts of its proposed action and undertakes to limit envi-
ronmental harm to an insignificant level. Through this indirect 
route, the mitigated FONSI advances NEPA’s goal of integrating en-
vironmental considerations into project design, evaluation, decision, 
and implementation, arguably producing environmentally beneficial 
results.  
 To be sure, the approach is backhanded. NEPA’s authors expected 
the information revealed in the EIS, together with political pressure 
produced by public disclosure, to inform the selection of mitigation 
measures and drive improvements in the government’s environ-
                                                                                                                      
FONSIs: the agencies contend with conviction that they don’t have to write EISs to con-
sider all the bad things that might happen because they already have given careful 
thought to, and taken precautions against, all the bad things that might happen.”); Eric 
Glitzenstein, Project Modification: Illegitimate Circumvention of the EIS Requirement or 
Desirable Means to Reduce Adverse Environmental Impacts?, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 253, 271-78 
(1982) (arguing for more robust judicial review to ensure that agencies do not circumvent 
the EIS requirement through project modification). 
 96. Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) 
(stating that NEPA “imposes upon agencies duties that are ‘essentially procedural,’ ” de-
signed to ensure fully informed decisionmaking).  
 97. See Peter J. Eglick & Henryk J. Hiller, The Myth of Mitigation Under NEPA and 
SEPA, 20 ENVTL. L. 773, 776 (1990); cf. Michael Herz, Parallel Universes: NEPA Lessons 
for the New Property, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1668, 1712-13 (1993) (noting the “inherent circu-
larity” in the requirement that an EIS be prepared only if environmental impacts are “sig-
nificant,” a determination that presumably requires an investigation of the environmental 
impacts, so that paradoxically, “only by going through the process can the agency decide 
whether it is necessary to go through the process”). 
 98. See Herson, supra note 92, at 68 (stating that if mitigated FONSIs prevent envi-
ronmental harms, the result “would be consistent with NEPA’s underlying purpose of 
‘promot[ing] efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment’ ” (altera-
tion in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982))); Geoffrey T. McDonald & Lex Brown, 
Going Beyond Environmental Impact Assessment: Environmental Input to Planning and 
Design, 15 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 483, 487 (1995) (stating that the integration 
of environmental considerations into project design and planning “has occurred through 
EIA practice, not theory,” as “practitioners . . . have simply found it more expedient and 
logical to do this rather than waiting until the ‘EIA Report’ was completed . . . [at] a stage 
inconveniently late in the project to make design changes”). 
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mental performance.99 Instead, they constructed a formal EIS process 
so costly and cumbersome that agencies go to great lengths to avoid 
it, even if doing so requires costly mitigation measures. Ironically, 
then, the formal EIS becomes not the direct vehicle for improving en-
vironmental decisionmaking, but a penalty default requirement that 
applies only if the agency is unable to identify a mitigation plan that 
would bring the expected adverse environmental impacts of its pro-
posed action below the EIS-triggering threshold of significant. The 
EIS, in short, becomes the price the agency pays for failure to miti-
gate adverse environmental impacts at an early stage of project de-
sign. 
 This story of inadvertent policy success is not without complica-
tions, however. NEPA does not clearly require that the promised 
mitigation measures actually be implemented, and the courts have 
interpreted the subject as nonbinding.100 Similarly, projects are not 
typically monitored to verify the accuracy of predictions or to adjust 
mitigation measures in response to unexpected results.101 Thus, it is 
possible that a mitigation plan set forth in a mitigated FONSI will 
not be implemented at all, or if implemented, may turn out to be less 
effective than advertised.  
 The solution is straightforward: post-project monitoring to ensure 
that mitigation measures are effective, coupled with “adaptive miti-
gation” strategies to adjust mitigation measures as necessary to en-
sure that environmental objectives are met.102 With these modifica-
tions, the NEPA regime could become a model penalty default regu-
lation by imposing a burdensome—but hardly pointless—default pro-
cedure, the full environmental impact statement, while simultane-
                                                                                                                      
 99. See Karkkainen, supra note 38, at 911-12. 
 100. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 352 (1989) (noting 
that NEPA requires “that mitigation be discussed in sufficient detail to ensure that envi-
ronmental consequences have been fairly evaluated,” but does not require that “a complete 
mitigation plan be actually formulated and adopted”). CEQ guidance suggests that only 
binding mitigation measures can provide the basis for a mitigated FONSI, but this docu-
ment has been held to be nonbinding. See Cabinet Mountain Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 
F.2d 678, 682-83 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (characterizing CEQ guidance document as “merely an 
informal statement, not a regulation,” and “not . . . persuasive authority”). Some courts 
have insisted that the mitigation plans used to justify a FONSI be enforceable, but others 
have found a general commitment sufficient. See RODGERS, supra note 95, at 894 (“The 
case law on mitigated FONSIs is thoroughly divided around the proposition of how firm 
and binding the mitigation must be to avoid an EIS.”). 
 101. CEQ regulations recommend, but do not mandate, monitoring to verify implemen-
tation of mitigation measures. See 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(c) (2005) (“A monitoring and en-
forcement program shall be adopted . . . where applicable for any mitigation.” (emphasis 
added)). Each agency has discretion to determine whether a monitoring and enforcement 
program is applicable. See Karkkainen, supra note 38, at 936-37. Neither the statute nor 
regulations require monitoring of the effectiveness of mitigation measures. 
 102. See Karkkainen, supra note 38, at 938-46 (proposing post-project monitoring, 
adaptive mitigation, and creation of a new category of “contingent FONSI” subject to post-
project verification and correction requirements). 
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ously inviting regulated parties (here, federal agencies) to step for-
ward with creative solutions that avoid the penalty default by build-
ing environmentally protective design and mitigation elements into 
the project at the preproject planning stage. 
D.   Action-Forcing Penalty Defaults 
1.   Penalty Defaults on a Time Fuse: The “Statutory Hammer” of 
RCRA’s Land Ban 
 Frustrated with the slow pace of EPA action to promulgate hazard-
ous waste disposal standards, Congress amended the Solid Waste Dis-
posal Act in 1984 to add the Land Disposal Restriction (LDR) Program, 
better known as the land ban.103 Notwithstanding its name, the land 
ban is not an outright prohibition on land disposal. Instead, it provided 
for phased prohibitions on land disposal of specified categories of waste 
to take effect on specified dates unless the wastes are processed in ac-
cordance with EPA-promulgated treatment standards.104 
 The intent and effect of the land ban was to pressure the EPA to 
promulgate treatment standards before the specified statutory dead-
lines, lest the harsher default prohibitions take effect. Despite an 
abysmal record of inaction over the previous decade, the agency ac-
complished this Herculean regulatory task on time for every category 
of waste subject to the land ban.105 The land ban threat also created 
powerful incentives for the hazardous waste disposal industry to 
produce and disclose the information the EPA would need to promul-
gate the requisite standards and not interfere with the standard-
setting process.106 
                                                                                                                      
 103. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 
3221 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); see Stewart, supra note 8, at 
58 (attributing enactment of the RCRA land ban to congressional perceptions of “gross ne-
glect of duty by EPA Administrator Gorsuch in failing to implement RCRA”). 
 104. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d) (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 268 (2005). 
 105. See Randolph L. Hill, An Overview of RCRA: The “Mind-Numbing” Provisions of 
the Most Complicated Environmental Statute, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,254, 10,268 (1991) (not-
ing the land ban provides “a strong incentive for EPA to develop and promulgate the re-
quired standards on time to avoid the serious disruptions in the economy that would result 
from an inability to legally dispose of any hazardous wastes” with the result that the “EPA 
issued all of its § 3004(m) regulations on time”). 
 106. See Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Coopera-
tion, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 114 (2002) (stating that the land 
ban “made regulatory advocates of regulated firms, which hoped to forestall the land ban 
by encouraging EPA to adopt more palatable rules within the 32-month deadline”). 
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 The land ban is often characterized as a statutory hammer.107 The 
underlying logic is that of a regulatory penalty default on a time fuse, 
triggered by statutory command on a date certain if the agency fails 
to act within the prescribed period.108 Not all statutory hammers 
have the character of penalty defaults, however. For example, if the 
permitting agency fails to act on the permit application by a date cer-
tain, some permitting schemes automatically deem that a permit has 
been issued.109 Others provide that proposed rules automatically take 
effect if the agency fails to promulgate final rules by a certain date.110 
In such cases, the agency may be indifferent to the outcome and may 
allow the permit to issue by default without expenditure of additional 
agency resources. For its part, the legislature may simply want to 
ensure that some rule is in effect by the end of the specified period 
and grant the agency discretion to allow the default rule to take ef-
fect or to devise some alternative. Plainly, however, the RCRA land 
ban was intentionally designed to operate as a regulatory penalty de-
fault, and all available evidence suggests that the land ban has been 
a highly effective use of the penalty default within the context of con-
ventional environmental regulation. 
2.   Forcing “Cooperative” Federalism: SIPs, FIPs, and the Clean 
Air Act 
 The Clean Air Act is founded upon a federalist division on labor.111 
Under the statute, the federal EPA establishes health-based national 
ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for so-called criteria pollut-
ants.112 The states must then develop state implementation plans 
(SIPs) specifying enforceable emission limitations, monitoring re-
                                                                                                                      
 107.  See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, 
and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 839 (“Congress has 
given the EPA a certain period of time to regulate; if at the end of the specified time the 
agency has failed to act, the ‘hammer’ falls, and the regulatory result set forth in the stat-
ute automatically goes into effect.”).  
 108. See id. 
 109. See James T. O’Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the Veterans Appeals Proc-
ess Is Needed to Provide Fairness to Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 223, 249-50 & n.160 
(2001) (describing permit issuance in default of agency action by a date certain and rec-
ommending a similar procedure for veterans benefits claims). 
 110. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Congressional Control over Agency Rulemaking: The Nu-
trition Labeling and Education Act’s Hammer Provisions, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 149, 150-
51 (1995) (describing statutory hammer in which if FDA fails to promulgate final regula-
tions, proposed regulations automatically take effect). 
 111. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. 
REV. 1183, 1193 (1995). 
 112. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000). The statute nominally requires two standards, a “pri-
mary” standard at a level “requisite to protect the public health” with “an adequate margin 
of safety,” and a “secondary” standard at a level “requisite to protect the public welfare,” 
including property damage and nonhuman environmental impacts. Id. § 7409(b)(1)-(2). In 
most cases, the secondary standard is set at the same level as the primary health-based 
standard. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.6-.12 (2005). 
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quirements and enforcement programs.113 States have broad discre-
tion to choose the appropriate mix of regulatory tools and to allocate 
the pollution reduction burden among sources, but their SIPs require 
approval by the federal EPA, which reviews their submissions both 
for completeness and for substantive adequacy in achieving national 
air quality standards.114 Backstopping this “cooperative federalism” 
scheme, the EPA is mandated to impose a federal implementation 
plan (FIP) in default of an approved SIP.115 
 The background threat of direct federal regulatory intervention is 
a powerful inducement for states to develop their own Clean Air Act 
implementation plans. The vast majority of states are now operating 
under EPA-approved SIPs,116 and in most cases, these have led to 
major reductions in air pollution117 and substantial benefits to human 
health,118 even where compliance with federal air quality standards 
has been less than perfect.119  
 The Clean Air Act SIP-FIP requirement clearly exhibits the archi-
tecture of a penalty default scheme: direct federal regulation kicks in 
if the state fails to produce an acceptable pollution control plan, and 
states, seeking to avoid that undesired result, voluntarily produce, 
secure federal approval for, and implement SIPs. Why such a 
scheme? The standard explanation urges that the highly technical 
task of setting health-based air quality standards is most efficiently 
assigned to a single expert (federal) agency that can exploit superior 
technical, administrative, and fiscal capacities, while also eliminat-
                                                                                                                      
 113. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a). 
 114. Id. § 7410(c). 
 115. Id. § 7410(c)(1). 
 116. See Dwyer, supra note 111, at 1198 (stating “the vast majority of states” have de-
veloped state implementation plans in lieu of federal regulation because allocation of the 
pollution reduction burden is “enormously important on the state and local level”). 
 117. According to EPA, ambient levels of carbon monoxide fell 65% nationally between 
1983 and 2002; ground-level ozone 29% (1980-2003); lead 94% (1983-2002); NO2 21% 
(1980-2002); particulate matter (PM10) 17% (1993-2002); and sulfur dioxide 54% (1983-
2002), despite substantial population and GDP growth. EPA, Air Emissions Trends Con-
tinued Progress Through 2004, http://www.epa.gov/oar/airtrends/2005/econ-emissions.html. 
 118. EPA estimates that Clean Air Act regulations save approximately 205,000 lives 
and prevent over 22 million lost work days annually. See EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS 
OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970 TO 1990, at 37 tbl.9, 38 tbl.10 (1997). A separate OMB 
analysis concluded the health benefits of EPA’s major air quality programs outweighed 
costs by at least five-to-one. OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. 
AND BUDGET, INFORMING REGULATORY DECISIONS: 2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, 
LOCAL AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 9 tbl.3, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/   
2003_cost-ben_final_rpt.pdf. 
 119. In 2003, 124 air quality control regions in 33 states were in nonattainment of air 
quality standards for one or more criteria pollutants. See EPA, CRITERIA POLLUTANT AREA 
SUMMARY REPORT (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/greenbk/ancl2.html. 
Some 126 million people lived in these nonattainment areas. Id. 
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ing redundancy of regulatory effort.120 States, however, are thought 
to be better situated to make the location-specific trade-offs involved 
in allocating the pollution control burden among various sources, de-
cisions that implicate local patterns of land use and economic devel-
opment.121 Before federal intervention, most states failed to regulate 
air pollution effectively.122 The prospect of direct federal regulation 
threatens loss of local control over economic development with poten-
tially severe economic and political consequences. The choice for the 
states, then, is no longer whether to regulate, but rather who will do 
the regulating. They have a choice: either try to regulate wisely and 
well or entrust the task to distant federal officials who may be less 
sensitive to local economic and political conditions. Against that 
background threat, the incentive to undertake the politically difficult 
and administratively costly and challenging task of regulating air 
pollution becomes compelling.  
 The courts have held that this penalty default approach, which we 
may call “forced cooperative federalism,” does not violate the anti-
commandeering principle of New York v. United States123 because it 
involves mere “inducement” and not “outright coercion.”124 As one 
leading commentator notes, “Formally, at least, the states always 
have an exit option”—they can simply decline to adopt a SIP and 
leave the job to the federal EPA.125 
 Some critics contend that SIPs are actually one of the weak points 
of the Clean Air Act. They argue that the EPA lacks the administra-
tive, financial, and technical capacity to fill the regulatory void that 
would result from widespread failure by the states to adopt SIPs.126 
This factor, combined with bureaucratic concern about the political 
fallout that would attend overly aggressive SIP review, renders the 
                                                                                                                      
 120.  See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 
615 & n.165 (1996). 
 121. See id. at 614-17 (examining the argument that when solutions to problems de-
pend on “locality-specific factors,” states or local communities should decide); Dwyer, supra 
note 111, at 1198 (“[B]ecause air pollution regulation has a substantial impact on local 
economic development, states may believe they can achieve the federal goals more effi-
ciently and with less disruption of local economies than bureaucrats who answer to head-
quarters in Washington, D.C.”). 
 122. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND 
POLICY 86 (4th ed. 2003). 
 123. 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (striking down federal statute compelling states to adopt 
nuclear waste regulatory programs on grounds that “Congress may not simply ‘comman-
dee[r] the legislative processes of the States’ ” (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Rec-
lamation Ass’n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981))). 
 124. Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 881 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 125. Dwyer, supra note 111, at 1193. 
 126. See, e.g., Thomas Julian Page, The Limits of Devolution in Environmental Law: A 
Comparison of Regional and Statewide Ambient Air Quality Planning in the United States 
and Germany, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 527, 533; G. Nelson Smith & Evelio M. Grillo, Let’s 
Clear the Air Once and for All: Municipal Liability for Failing to Comply with Section 110 
of the Clean Air Act, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 1103, 1130 (1995). 
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FIP threat weaker in practice than it appears on paper.127 In addi-
tion, the EPA’s review of SIPs rests mainly on information supplied 
by the states themselves, which may reflect incomplete pollution 
source inventories, uncertain air quality modeling, and inadequate 
monitoring. Consequently, states may have both the opportunity and 
motive to game the SIP review process by producing rosier air qual-
ity forecasts than are borne out in practice.128 
 Notwithstanding these criticisms, the Clean Air Act’s SIP-FIP 
scheme is at least a moderately successful application of the regula-
tory penalty default device within the confines of conventional envi-
ronmental regulation. It has induced the vast majority of states to 
undertake responsibility for air pollution control within their 
boundaries. Despite the obvious political and financial costs, most 
states have committed substantial legal, technical, and administra-
tive resources to the task—far greater commitments than many 
would have undertaken absent the FIP incentive. 
 A notable feature of the SIP-FIP scheme is that it is highly struc-
tured, setting out clear, objective criteria for determining what trig-
gers the default rule and when it is avoided. The state’s proposed SIP 
must be both “complete” and substantively adequate to achieve nu-
merically specific air quality targets for all pollutants subject to 
NAAQS and in every air quality control region in the state.129 
 Like the RCRA land ban, the SIP-FIP scheme operates on a short 
time fuse: states are granted a statutory grace period within which to 
develop, submit, and win EPA approval for their SIPs, and the EPA 
may not impose a FIP until that period expires.130 The presumption 
here, as with the land ban, is that the penalty default is only a 
backup, taking effect only if the party fails to undertake the regula-
tory effort that would allow it to avoid the default. 
 Note, however, that the FIP mechanism differs from the land ban 
in at least one crucial respect: the FIP is not expressly designed to 
produce a draconian regulatory consequence. The EPA has broad dis-
cretionary authority to include whatever control measures the 
agency deems necessary in its FIP, and in principle these need not be 
                                                                                                                      
 127. See Dwyer, supra note 111, at 1201-06.  
 128. See Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the 
Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 243-45 (1999). 
 129. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2000) (requiring SIP to achieve NAAQS in each quality 
control region in the state); id. § 7410(k) (requiring the EPA to deterimine whether SIP 
submissions are complete and substantially adequate). 
 130. States have three years after a NAAQS is promulgated to submit a SIP. Id. § 
7410(a)(1). EPA then has twelve months to approve or disapprove, and twenty-four months 
to promulgate a FIP. Id. § 7410(k)(2). 
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more onerous than those in a well-designed SIP.131 As in the Proposi-
tion 65 case, then, the operative penalty in the FIP case is not the 
certainty of harsh regulatory outcomes, but rather uncertainty—
here, the political and economic uncertainty associated with loss of 
local control over regulatory matters of great local significance. 
IV.   STRUCTURING “NEW GOVERNANCE” COLLABORATION 
 The foregoing examples—Proposition 65, the Endangered Species 
Act, NEPA, the RCRA land ban, and the Clean Air Act SIP-FIP pro-
visions—illustrate extant uses of penalty default mechanisms in con-
ventional environmental regulation that have had varying degrees of 
success. These range from the highly effective (Proposition 65 and 
the land ban), to the moderately successful (FIPs in the Clean Air 
Act), to intriguing but not yet fully proven possibilities of turning 
conventional regulation toward experimentalist ends (HCPs and 
mitigated FONSIs). 
 What has any of this to do with new governance? Properly struc-
tured, penalty default rules might be used to induce meaningful par-
ticipation in locally devolved, place-based, collaborative, public-private 
hybrid, new governance institutions, aimed at integrated, adaptive, 
experimentalist management of watersheds and other institutions. 
 Consider the problem of integrated watershed management. Al-
though nationally uniform, technology-based regulations have dra-
matically curbed pollution from large industrial and municipal 
wastewater “point” sources, the Clean Water Act (CWA) does little to 
address polluted run-off from diffuse “nonpoint sources” like farms 
and city streets.132 As a result, water quality remains poor in many 
lakes and streams.133 In addition, despite the statute’s stated goals to 
“restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity 
of the Nation’s waters”134 and to “conserve such waters for the protec-
tion and propagation of fish and aquatic life,”135 its narrow opera-
tional focus on point-source pollution control leaves broader ques-
tions of aquatic ecosystem health unattended—leading to the frag-
mentation and degradation of wetlands and other important aquatic 
and riparian habitats, declining populations of aquatic species, pro-
                                                                                                                      
 131. Id. § 7410(c)(1) (authorizing the EPA Administrator to promulgate a federal im-
plementation plan if a state fails to submit a SIP or submits an inadequate SIP and fails to 
correct the deficiency). 
 132. See Wendy E. Wagner, Restoring Polluted Waters with Public Values, 25 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 429, 430-31 (2000). 
 133. Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973, 
990 (1995) (“Polluted runoff is the largest source of water pollution in the United States 
and a major source of physical and hydrological impairment and habitat loss.”). See Wag-
ner, supra note 132, at 430-31. 
 134. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000). 
 135. Id. § 1252(a). 
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liferation of invasive species, and related ills.136  These are intercon-
nected problems. Poor water quality degrades aquatic habitats and 
contributes to declines in species populations. The loss of riparian 
buffers, filtering wetlands, and filter-feeding shellfish compounds 
water quality problems. The precise mix and severity of these prob-
lems vary from one watershed to the next. 
 Scientists, natural resource managers, and environmental policy 
experts have long urged a reorientation of law and public policy to-
ward integrated management of this entire suite of problems at wa-
tershed scales.137 Yet, despite broad support for this policy transfor-
mation from the highest policy circles to local grassroots levels, tech-
nology-based point-source controls retain their central role in U.S. 
regulatory policy, with integrated watershed management relegated 
to the periphery. 
 A newly revived total maximum daily load (TMDL) program in 
the 1990s, reinforced by a new and far-reaching TMDL rule promul-
gated late in the Clinton Administration, brought renewed hope that 
states might finally be compelled to address nonpoint-source pollu-
tion and integrated watershed management.138  
 The CWA requires states to identify “impaired” waters not meet-
ing water quality standards and to establish TMDLs—binding caps 
on total pollutant loadings, translatable into individual allocations 
for each pollution source—for pollutants entering those waters.139 
TMDLs thus threaten to impose stricter limits on pollutant dis-
charges into impaired waters than are ordinarily required under the 
first-tier CWA permit system. If a state fails to produce an adequate 
                                                                                                                      
 136. See COMM. ON RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 277-
80 (1992). 
 137. See id. at 342 (recommending restoration of aquatic ecosystems through “man-
agement of all significant ecological elements be coordinated in a comprehensive approach . 
. . on a watershed or other landscape scale”); Adler, supra note 133, at 977 (noting the 
growing interest in watershed management due to “the futility of trying to solve complex, 
interrelated water problems through individual decisions on thousands of discrete but con-
nected activities”). But cf. Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water Quality 
Standards-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,329, 10,331-
43 (1997) (arguing integrated watershed management is impossibly ambitious given its 
complexity and urging reliance on technology-based command-and-control regulation 
which has achieved significant water quality improvements). 
 138. As one EPA official explained, TMDLs “if done properly, and properly conceived, 
can inform, empower, and energize citizens, local communities and States to improve wa-
ter quality at the local watershed level. The basic information derived from a sound TMDL 
could liberate the creative energies of those most likely to benefit from reduced pollutant 
loadings to their own waters in their own neighborhood.” The Future of the TMDL Pro-
gram: How to Make TMDLs Effective Tools for Improving Water Quality: Hearing Before 
the H. Subcomm. on Water Resources & Environment of the H. Comm. on Transportation 
and Infrastructure, 107th Cong. 4 (2001) (statement of Tracy Mehan, Assistant Adminis-
trator for Water, EPA). 
 139. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A), (C) (2000). 
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TMDL, the obligation shifts to the EPA to produce a federal TMDL.140 
This forced cooperative federalism structure closely resembles the 
Clean Air Act’s SIP-FIP scheme.141 
 Because the statute lacks firm deadlines for submission and ap-
proval of impaired waters lists and TMDLs, however, the EPA and 
states largely ignored section 303(d) until the late 1980s.142 At that 
point, a rash of citizen suits successfully advanced the theory that 
persistent failure to submit the required lists amounted to “construc-
tive submission” of inadequate lists, obligating the EPA to impose 
TMDLs where states had failed to do so.143  
 This litigation blitz forced the EPA to reexamine section 303(d). 
Reversing course, the Clinton Administration abandoned its defen-
sive litigation posture in favor of an aggressive policy offensive, 
promulgating a new rule reinterpreting the section 303(d) TMDL re-
quirement to promote integrated, watershed-based planning and to 
require states to include enforceable controls on nonpoint—source 
and point—source pollution in their TMDLs.144 The rule—later sus-
pended and subsequently withdrawn by the Bush Administra-
tion145—would also require states to establish continuous water qual-
ity monitoring and modeling programs and to provide the basis for 
subsequent adjustments to their TMDLs if the initial measures did 
not improve water quality to acceptable levels.  
 It is apparent that the Clean Water Act’s TMDL requirements in-
corporate a federalism-based penalty default scheme resembling the 
Clean Air Act’s SIP-FIP provisions. States can be expected to develop 
TMDLs because they fear the harsh consequences for land use and 
economic development that might ensue if they leave the job to the 
                                                                                                                      
 140. Id. § 1313(d)(2). 
 141. See Sarah Birkeland, EPA’s TMDL Program, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 297, 318-19 (2001) 
(“Both programs confer substantial responsibility on states to devise and implement pollu-
tion controls according to local economic and environmental conditions, within parameters 
set by applicable air or water quality standards. . . . [The] EPA may exercise substitution 
authority where a state fails to meet its statutory and regulatory obligations . . . .”). 
 142. See Robert L. Glicksman, The Value of Agency-Forcing Citizen Suits to Enforce 
Nondiscretionary Duties, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 353, 373-74 (2004) (attributing EPA’s inac-
tion to a desire to adopt technology-based regulation first, and states’ inaction to a lack of 
pressure from EPA). 
 143. See id. at 375-79. Initial lawsuits failed, as courts construed the absence of statu-
tory deadlines to confer discretion on EPA to determine its own TMDL timetable. The legal 
breakthrough came when the Seventh Circuit held that “if a state fails over a long period 
of time to submit proposed TMDL’s, this prolonged failure may amount to the ‘constructive 
submission’ by that state of no TMDL’s,” obligating EPA to act. Scott v. City of Hammond, 
741 F.2d 992, 996-97 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 144. See 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586 (July 13, 2000) (stating the final EPA rule revising re-
quirements for states to establish and enforce TMDLs of pollution from point and nonpoint 
sources for waterways with impaired water quality). 
 145. See 66 Fed. Reg. 53,044 (Oct. 18, 2001) (postponing effective date of July 13, 2000 
TMDL rule to April 30, 2003); 68 Fed. Reg. 13,608 (Mar. 19, 2003) (withdrawing July, 13 
2000 TMDL rule). 
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federal EPA. In some cases, the TMDL program appears to have had 
just that effect. For example, New York and Connecticut jointly de-
veloped and won EPA approval for a TMDL for dissolved oxygen in 
Long Island Sound incorporating a series of phased reductions in ni-
trogen loadings from various categories of point and nonpoint sources 
in both states.146 
 But TMDLs also embrace a second, subtler, and ultimately more 
interesting penalty default mechanism. Developing and implement-
ing TMDLs is a costly and technically demanding task, requiring 
comprehensive water quality and discharge data, detailed scientific 
information, and sophisticated hydrological and pollutant dispersal 
modeling capabilities that severely test the fiscal, technical, and ad-
ministrative capacities of most states.147 Some argue that the finan-
cial and technical resources required to meet the demands of the 
TMDL process could effectively bankrupt state environmental pro-
tection efforts, thus undermining other, potentially more cost-
effective water quality and aquatic ecosystem management strate-
gies. This has led many states to oppose the Clinton-era EPA’s ag-
gressive effort to expand the TMDL program, or at a minimum to ar-
gue for a more flexible approach.148 
 But the costly, straightjacketing character of the formal TMDL 
process has also triggered a new round of aggressive, proactive ef-
forts on the part of some states to improve water quality in waters 
currently on their impaired waters lists, to preempt the need to pro-
duce TMDLs at all. For example, the Chesapeake Bay Program—a 
basin-wide collaborative effort by the EPA, the states of Maryland, 
Virginia, and Pennsylvania, local governments, NGOs, and leading 
private sector actors to restore aquatic ecosystem health in the na-
tion’s largest estuary, widely regarded as the most sophisticated and 
institutionally well-articulated of the new governance watershed 
management initiatives—has undertaken, with the EPA’s approval, 
a self-designed, collaborative, and experimental parallel TMDL proc-
ess to assign pollutant loads basin-wide and on a tributary-specific 
basis, with the goal to improve water quality to levels that would al-
low participating states to remove Bay waters and tributaries from 
their impaired waters lists by 2010, a year before TMDLs would be 
                                                                                                                      
 146. See Press Release, Long Island Sound Office of the Envtl. Protection Agency, EPA 
Takes Action to Control Nitrogen Pollution in Long Island Sound (Apr. 5, 2001), 
http://www.longislandsoundstudy.net/press/TMDL.rls.PDF. 
 147. See Oliver A. Houck, The Clean Water Act TMDL Program V: Aftershock and 
Prelude, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,385, 10,389-96 (2002). 
 148. See Letter from Governors Kenny C. Guinn & Thomas J. Vilsack, Nat’l Governors’ 
Ass’n to President Clinton (July 6, 2000) (expressing governors’ concerns about fiscal 
impact estimated at $1-2 billion annually and perceived “inflexibility” and onerous pro-
cedural requirements of July 2000 TMDL rule), available at http://www.nasda.org/joint/ 
00June-TMDL-President.htm. 
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required. The Chesapeake Bay Program acknowledges that achieving 
these ambitious, tributary-specific pollutant load reduction goals will 
require an integrated effort, including aggressive new land use poli-
cies, agricultural nutrient management planning, restoration of wet-
lands and riparian forest buffers, integration of groundwater and 
surface water management, and restoration of filter-feeding oyster 
populations. By obviating the need for a formal TMDL through pro-
active watershed management, however, Chesapeake Bay Program 
partners argued they would protect flexibility for ongoing experimen-
tation and integrated approaches to ecosystem restoration and man-
agement.149 The TMDL penalty default threat thus appeared to lend 
discipline and urgency to a collaborative new governance effort in the 
basin that has tended to advance by fits and starts.  
 These creative efforts may be undercut by the Bush Administra-
tion’s withdrawal of the Clinton-era TMDL rule and restoration of the 
status quo ante of an earlier TMDL rule widely viewed as ineffective. 
The EPA insists that it is continuing to develop new TMDL revisions 
that will improve upon both the status quo and the Clinton-era rule,150 
but the current Administration’s broad retreat from longstanding en-
vironmental protection objectives suggests little cause for optimism. 
 For purposes of this Article, however, the status of the TMDL rule 
per se is not as important as the underlying regulatory mechanism 
this example illustrates. Suppose the case for multiparty, collabora-
tive, integrated, experimentalist approaches to watershed manage-
ment is as strong as new governance advocates, leading scientists, 
and natural resource managers claim. Skeptics, however, contend 
that good intentions alone are insufficient; sometimes stronger medi-
cine is needed to induce parties to undertake the burdens of envi-
ronmental protection and to refrain from potentially counterproduc-
tive strategic behavior. 
 Consider, then, what might be gained by adopting a penalty de-
fault rule, structured along the lines of the Clinton-era TMDL rule to 
impose onerous procedural and substantive requirements on a time-
delayed basis, to be triggered if flexible experimentation fails to 
achieve satisfactory objective results within the specified period. 
Such an approach could act as a powerful spur to action, focusing the 
attention of local actors squarely on objectively measurable environ-
mental performance targets and creating a sense of urgency in the 
                                                                                                                      
 149. See Chesapeake Bay Water Quality Protection and Restoration: An Innovative Ap-
proach, BACKGROUNDER, Apr. 14, 2003, available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/ 
waterqualitycriteria/doc_wq_backgrounders_081601.pdf. 
 150. See Press Release, EPA, Final Withdrawal of 2000 TMDL Rules Takes Effect; 
Existing Rules Make Progress Cleaning Up Impaired Wates [sic] (Mar. 13, 2003), 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/b1ab9f485b098972852562e7004dc686/ 
601385d1f25da12485256ce800824d38?OpenDocument. 
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task of identifying and implementing effective, locally tailored 
strategies to achieve those performance targets, while still allowing 
broad-ranging discretion for local institutional and policy experimen-
tation. A properly designed penalty default approach, in short, ap-
pears capable of imposing discipline, accountability, and transpar-
ency from above on locally flavored, bottom-up, flexible new govern-
ance experimentation from below.  
V.   DESTABILIZATION RIGHTS AS PENALTY DEFAULTS 
A.   Administrative Destabilization Rights:                  
Disentrenchment from Above 
 Chuck Sabel and Bill Simon recently advanced a provocative the-
ory of destabilization rights, understood as “claims to unsettle and 
open up public institutions that have chronically failed to meet their 
obligations and that are substantially insulated from the normal 
processes of political accountability.”151 On Sabel and Simon’s view, 
much recent public law litigation—typically, litigation to vindicate 
constitutional or statutory civil rights or civil liberties allegedly vio-
lated in the course of operations of important public institutions like 
schools, prisons, police forces, or various arms of the welfare state—
seeks as a remedy the destabilization and disentrenchment of the 
failing institutions. The aim and effect of these suits, they argue, is 
to “widen the possibilities of experimentalist collaboration”152 in cre-
ating far-reaching institutional restructuring, while avoiding the pit-
falls of a detailed, prescriptive, judicially imposed remedy. This re-
orientation in public law litigation, they argue, is part of a broader 
trend away from command-and-control solutions and toward experi-
mentalist new governance. Surveying the cases, they conclude that a 
prima facie case for destabilization consists of two elements: first, a 
clear and persistent violation of standards, and second, “political 
blockage,”153 that is, a defect in the conventional mechanisms of po-
litical accountability that systematically blocks movement toward a 
resolution of the underlying problem. 
 Sabel and Simon identify several broad classes of public law liti-
gation where the destabilization rights model has taken hold, includ-
ing school equity and adequacy, mental health, prisons, police abuse, 
and housing.154 All the examples they cite revolve around federal and 
state constitutional and statutory civil rights provisions.  
                                                                                                                      
 151. Sabel & Simon, supra note 17, at 1020. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 1062. 
 154. Id. at 1022-28 (school equity and adequacy); id. at 1029-34 (mental health); id. at 
1034-43 (prisons); id. at 1043-47 (police abuse); id. at 1047-52 (housing). 
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 The destabilization rights construct also has applications beyond 
civil rights litigation, however. In particular, a form of administra-
tive destabilization right may prove useful as a disciplining mecha-
nism in the context of centrally coordinated networks of locally de-
volved, collaborative new governance institutions—the sort of two-
tiered structure of accountability contemplated by advocates of the 
brand of new governance-styled democratic experimentalism. 
 In their seminal work A Constitution of Democratic Experimental-
ism, Chuck Sabel and Mike Dorf argued that more was required of 
an effective new governance regime than simple devolution of au-
thority to local, multiparty collaborative institutions.155 Central to 
their experimentalist vision is the notion that local experiments 
should run in parallel, allowing tailoring to unique local circum-
stances while also maximizing opportunities for local experimenta-
tion, comparative benchmarking, and horizontal diffusion of success-
ful innovations.156 A critical element in this new regulatory architec-
ture is a central coordinating and monitoring body—the “new center” 
as democratic experimentalists style it, distinguishing its role from 
the traditional, hierarchical, rule-imposing regulatory center of 
command-and-control style regulation.157 The function of the new 
center is to collect and pool information from varied local experi-
ments, distill and diffuse the lessons learned, formulate (in consulta-
tion with local units) provisional minimum performance standards, 
and intervene when local experiments go awry.158 
 In a subsequent work, Beyond Backyard Environmentalism, Sabel 
and his colleagues argued that a similar structure should form the 
backbone of an experimentalist environmental policy, again contend-
ing that simple devolution of authority to local collaborative watershed 
management initiatives or to regional-scale habitat conservation plan-
ning efforts was not an adequate response to the deficiencies of con-
ventional command-style regulation. Central coordination and moni-
toring, they argued, were essential to ensure accountability, transpar-
ency, diffusion of successful experimental models, and achievement of 
minimum performance objectives. More generally, managing complex 
ecological problems intelligently over the long run would require the 
development of mechanisms for rigorous, system-wide institutional 
                                                                                                                      
 155. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimen-
talism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998). 
 156. Id. at 287-88 (describing a model of public sector decisionmaking based on “linked 
systems of local and inter-local or federal pooling of information,” applying principles of 
“benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and error correction” so that “actors . . . learn 
from one another’s successes and failures”). 
 157. Charles F. Sabel et al., Beyond Backyard Environmentalism, in BEYOND 
BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM 3, 14-15 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2000) (describ-
ing the role of the central monitoring body in relation to semiautonomous local units). 
 158. Id.  
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learning, which in turn would depend on effective central coordination 
of the disparate parts of the new regulatory system.159  
 Reactions to these proposals have ranged from enthusiasm,160 to 
quizzical interest,161 to deafening silence, to noisy rejections162 and 
even some surprisingly vituperative ad hominem attacks.163 A common 
theme among the critics and the less-than-fully-persuaded is doubt 
concerning the coordinating and disciplining role of the new center. 
How, the skeptics ask, might the new regulatory center impose disci-
pline and minimum standards on the locally devolved parts, without 
falling back on the same old rigid, hierarchical, top-down, command-
style rulemaking and straightjacketing procedural formalization that 
this new regulatory system sought so assiduously to avoid? Aren’t the 
democratic experimentalists trying to have it both ways, they ask: to 
“have our central government and reject it too”?164 
 The answer, of course, is yes. The democratic experimentalist ar-
chitecture seeks to retain an important role for the regulatory center, 
but to redefine that role by replacing a highly prescriptive, rule-
bound, top-down management approach with one that devolves most 
operational authority to decentralized units but insists on account-
ability for performance and retains the right to intervene in local 
government in the event of palpable failure.  
 That architecture is not difficult to imagine in other organizational 
settings. A business corporation, for example, might be so centralized 
that lower-level operating units simply carry out a series of detailed 
commands from corporate headquarters. Alternatively, the corporation 
might adopt a decentralized structure in which individual operating 
units have greater autonomy to set their own goals, targets, work 
                                                                                                                     
 159. Id. at 8-9. 
 160. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 16, at 424-32 (describing the emergence of “new gov-
ernance” approaches to environmental regulation); id. at 469 (optimistically concluding 
that “advances in legal theory are increasingly pointing to the possibility of renewal 
through governance”). 
 161. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 12; William E. Scheuerman, Democratic Experimen-
talism or Capitalist Synchronization? Critical Reflections on Directly-Deliberative Polyar-
chy, 17 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 101 (2004). 
 162. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 
81 MINN. L. REV. 869, 974-75 (1997) (dismissing ecosystem management as “politics with a 
strong flavor of law-avoidance”); Sheila Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of De-
volved Collaboration, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 459, 498 (2002) (arguing that “devolved col-
laboration” is “indifferent to the ecological, social, and political conditions necessary to re-
alize its own promise” and “may in fact further solidify . . . procedural and distributional 
injustice”). 
 163. See, e.g., Theodore J. Lowi, Frontyard Propaganda, in BEYOND BACKYARD 
ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 157, at 70, 71, 75 (dismissing Beyond Backyard Environ-
mentalism as “propaganda” for “the decadent phase of classical liberalism,” revealing the 
“insidious neoclassical liberal (Republican party) influence on the thinking of intelligent 
policy analysts and advocates”). 
 164. Id. at 71. 
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rules, production plans, and so on, but nonetheless remain accountable 
to the corporate center for financial performance, product quality, en-
vironmental outcomes, and other firm-wide performance objectives.165 
Persistent failure on the part of one or more operating units to achieve 
satisfactory results along these measurable dimensions of performance 
would invite an intervention from headquarters—for example, reas-
signing key managers or re-examining goals, targets, and operating 
assumptions. We are not accustomed to government operating this 
way, but at bottom, the concept of coordinated decentralization is not 
terribly difficult to understand. 
 My modest ambition here is to adapt the Sabel-Simon notion of 
destabilization rights to elaborate on the redefined role of the new 
center in experimentalist regulation. The idea is that while refrain-
ing from prescribing ex cathedra and in excruciating detail the pro-
cedures, standards, goals, objectives, performance targets, operating 
principles, institutional forms, and mandatory rules by which local 
units must operate, the new center might retain the ultimate whip 
hand through an administrative destabilization right over local ar-
rangements. That is, the center would retain the right to intervene, 
unsettle, and disentrench local efforts that were deemed to be failing 
because the local efforts were chronically underperforming relative to 
expectations; or, because they evidenced indications of regulatory 
capture, distortions arising from strategic bargaining by one or more 
participants, or any of the assorted procedural defects that the critics 
claim will inevitably infect devolved, collaborative deliberation. No-
tice that these two elements—chronic underperformance relative to 
established norms coupled with political blockage—correspond to Sa-
bel and Simon’s prima facie case for a destabilization remedy in the 
public law litigation context. 
 The only difference is that the destabilization right I propose here 
is an administrative control mechanism, not a judicial remedy for a 
constitutional or statutory violation. But the two are certainly not in-
compatible. In principle at least, we might authorize both external 
checks on the entire system through the judicial process and internal 
checks on the performance of local units through central administra-
tive oversight and a right of destabilizing administrative interven-
tion. In either case, the destabilization right concept captures the 
sort of cure that experimentalists would think appropriate in cases of 
chronic underperformance and process failure: disentrenchment of 
the failing institutional arrangements coupled with a normative cri-
tique, creating an opening for a fresh start under new arrangements 
                                                                                                                      
 165. See William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Re-
gimes (Columbia Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Papers Group, Paper No. 04-79, 2004), 
available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=columbia/pllt. 
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that are not prescribed in detail from above, but instead are fash-
ioned by the participants themselves in response to the critique. In 
such cases, the destabilization remedy can have powerful and far-
reaching effects, and its availability can serve as a useful disciplining 
influence on participants in locally devolved processes. 
 This conception, I submit, should go some way toward clarifying 
the relationship between the new center and the local parts in de-
mocratic experimentalist theory. 
B.   Citizen Suits: Disentrenchment from Below 
 Most U.S. environmental statutes authorize private citizens to sue 
to enforce the law against either private parties who breach regulatory 
requirements or against government officials who fail to perform man-
datory duties.166 Most citizen suits are of the first type: for example, a 
citizen—or an NGO on behalf of members directly and concretely 
harmed by the legal infraction—might sue a polluter for violating an 
effluent limitation standard under the Clean Water Act.167 Typically, 
these suits aim to secure strict enforcement of conventional regulatory 
rules and standards, often in circumstances where the government en-
forcement agency has overlooked the violation, whether inadvertently 
or as a matter of policy or enforcement priorities.168 
 Citizen suits compelling agencies to perform nondiscretionary du-
ties are the more interesting category for our purposes. Many suits of 
this type, and typically the easiest to win, are “deadline suits” to 
compel the agency to promulgate a rule, issue a report, or take some 
other mandatory action by a certain date required by the statute.169  
 While some suits to enforce nondiscretionary duties may amount 
to little more than procedural nitpicking,170 others have had far-
                                                                                                                      
 166. The Clean Water Act citizen suit provision is typical:  
[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf— 
  (1) against any person . . . alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent stan-
dard or limitation under this Act or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or 
a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or  
  (2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Admin-
istrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretion-
ary . . . . 
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2000). 
 167. See Thompson, supra note 26, at 204 (stating that “the vast majority of citizen 
suits to date have been brought” to enforce permit requirements under the Clean Water 
Act “where the filing by permittees of periodic discharge reports has made citizen suits eas-
ier to pursue”). 
 168. See id. at 190-92 (stating that public enforcement of environmental laws is incom-
plete due to undetected violations, deferential enforcement policies, and inadequate agency 
staffing and funding). 
 169. See Glicksman, supra note 142, at 356. 
 170. For example, critics charge that suits to compel the Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) 
to designate critical habitat and produce recovery plans for endangered wildlife species 
force expenditure of scarce agency resources on procedurally mandatory but legally ineffec-
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reaching effects. Citizen suits have compelled agencies to launch en-
tire new regulatory programs like the prevention of significant dete-
rioration (PSD) regulations under the Clean Air Act171 or the ambi-
tious Clinton-era total maximum daily load (TMDL) rule to address 
water pollution exceeding established water quality standards.172 
Endangered Species Act lawsuits have been especially potent, occa-
sioning large-scale reconfigurations of federal land management poli-
cies, such as the Clinton-era Northwest Forest Plan—an ambitious 
ecosystem management, monitoring, and restoration plan for feder-
ally owned forests in the Pacific Northwest devised in response to a 
series of ESA citizen suits to protect the endangered northern spot-
ted owl and various salmon species, incorporating elements of col-
laborative watershed-based planning and adaptive management.173 
ESA citizen suits were also important factors motivating the launch 
of the Everglades restoration project.174  
 Occasionally, citizen suits have been used to thwart novel collabo-
rative governance regimes. For example, in Oregon Natural Re-
sources Council v. Daley,175 environmentalists successfully invoked 
the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act to undercut 
the Oregon Coastal Salmon Restoration Initiative, a collaborative, 
adaptive ecosystem management governance effort undertaken in 
hopes of averting Endangered Species Act listings of several salmon 
species.176 The court held that the National Marine Fisheries Service 
could not rely on “future efforts” and “voluntary measures” in the 
                                                                                                                      
tive designations, diverting effort from other tasks that have far reaching legal conse-
quences, such as additional endangered species listings. See Federico Cheever, Recovery 
Planning, the Courts and the Endangered Species Act, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 106, 
108-09 (2001) (stating that courts have held recovery plans can be reviewed for substantive 
adequacy but their provisions are unenforceable); Daniel J. Rohlf, Section 4 of the Endan-
gered Species Act: Top Ten Issues for the Next Thirty Years, 34 ENVTL. L. 483, 526 (2004) 
(quoting an Assistant Secretary of the Interior who warns that the “flood of litigation over 
critical habitat designation is preventing the Fish and Wildlife Service from protecting new 
species and reducing its ability to recover plants and animals already listed”). 
 171. See Glicksman, supra note 142, at 358-61 (describing the history of the PSD program).  
 172. See supra notes 138-50 and accompanying text. 
 173. See Michael C. Blumm, The Amphibious Salmon: The Evolution of Ecosystem 
Management in the Columbia River Basin, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 653, 663-74 (1997) (recounting 
the history of ESA citizen suits in the Pacific Northwest and the development of the 
Northwest Forest Plan as an administrative effort to break the policy gridlock through a 
collaborative, multiparty ecosystem management initiative). 
 174. See John J. Fumero & Keith W. Rizzardi, The Everglades Ecosystem: From Engi-
neering to Litigation to Consensus-Based Restoration, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 667 (2001) 
(describing history of the citizen suit and intergovernmental litigation in the Florida Ever-
glades leading to destabilization of longstanding water management arrangements and 
initiation of collaborative ecosystem restoration initiatives). 
 175. 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (1998). 
 176. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental “Rule of Law” Litigation, 17 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 267-68 (2000) (describing the Daley case as “a hard one” that can 
be interpreted either as a “laudable effort by a court to expose a pseudo-protection plan” or 
as a “premature intervention in a risky but promising management strategy”). 
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Restoration Initiative in making its listing determinations.177 Since 
the parties had agreed to collaborate in large measure to avoid the 
straightjacketing regulatory restrictions that would accompany ESA 
listing—that is, to avoid the regulatory penalty default of ESA regu-
lation—the court’s ruling was a major setback that, if widely fol-
lowed, may bode ill for future efforts to use the penalty default 
threats of ESA listing to motivate voluntary participation in new 
governance undertakings. 
 Daley should not be taken as the archetypal case, however. Cases 
in which citizen-initiated litigation has been used to destabilize and 
disentrench established institutional practices and modes of govern-
ance that are palpably failing to provide integrated, place-sensitive, 
and adaptive environmental and natural resource management ap-
pear to be widespread. A particularly instructive example is the liti-
gation surrounding Mono Lake, a saline terminal lake in California’s 
Sierra Nevada whose freshwater tributaries were being diverted by 
the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (DWP) under ap-
propriative water rights granted by the state Water Resources 
Board, leading (predictably) to declining lake levels, increased salin-
ity, and associated ecological harms.178 The National Audubon Soci-
ety sued to force administrative reconsideration of these water diver-
sions. The California Supreme Court held that in initially awarding 
and continuing to recognize Los Angeles’s water rights, the state had 
failed to discharge its ongoing “public trust” obligation to manage 
Mono Lake—a navigable water body—in a manner consistent with 
protection of ecological, recreational, and aesthetic values.179 Recog-
nizing that a once-off reassignment of water rights would not be suf-
ficient to reconcile the ongoing conflict between Los Angeles’s legiti-
mate water supply needs and the ecological demands of Mono Lake, 
the court remanded the matter to the Water Board. What eventually 
emerged out of follow-up litigation, administrative proceedings, and 
complex negotiations among the DWP, city officials, environmental-
ists, state agencies, and others was an ongoing, collaborative conser-
vation effort that seeks to couple demand-side water conservation 
                                                                                                                     
 177. See Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1159 (“However laudable Oregon’s efforts to employ 
new management techniques to try to restore the [salmon], such future, voluntary conser-
vation efforts cannot be a legal substitute for listing.”). 
 178. See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Working Out an Environmental Ethic: Anniver-
sary Lessons from Mono Lake, 4 WYO. L. REV. 1, 13-15 (2004). 
 179. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 724-26 
(Cal. 1983). The Mono Lake litigation was not based on a statutory citizen suit provision. 
The case was decided under the common law public trust doctrine, but the parallels be-
tween this doctrine and statutory citizen suit provisions have been widely noted. See, e.g., 
Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the Chang-
ing Definition of Pluralism, 1945-1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1448-49 (2000) (tracing the 
development of environmental citizen suit provisions to Joseph Sax’s earlier work on the 
public trust doctrine). 
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initiatives in Los Angeles with continuous monitoring and adaptive 
management of Mono Lake and its tributaries, thus allowing fresh-
water diversions to continue at adjustable levels calibrated both to 
the ecological needs of the lake and to fluctuations in urban water 
demand. The resulting new governance arrangement—a multiparty, 
intergovernmental, interagency, public-private collaboration—has 
been hailed as a model for ecologically sensitive water management 
throughout the arid West180 where water is the critical limiting re-
source for environmental protection, economic development, and 
population growth alike.181  
 Similarly, citizen suits under the Endangered Species Act played 
a major role in disentrenching failing natural resource management 
institutions in the Columbia River of the Pacific Northwest, opening 
space for collaborative, adaptive new governance approaches.182  
 In still other cases, such as the San Francisco Bay-Delta, mere an-
ticipation of the consequences of potentially destabilizing Endan-
gered Species Act lawsuits has operated to disentrench established, 
and failing, institutional patterns in favor of new governance solu-
tions.183 This development effectively transforms an unexercised de-
stabilization right into a distinctive kind of regulatory penalty de-
fault, providing the necessary incentive to induce parties to under-
take voluntarily to reconfigure institutional arrangements and to ini-
tiate ambitious collaborative self-regulatory measures to avoid (or 
preempt) the much harsher consequences that might follow from citi-
zen-initiated ESA litigation.  
 Beyond these documented uses of citizen suits to initiate new gov-
ernance collaborations, anecdotal evidence suggests that retention of 
the background threat of destabilizing citizen suits can operate as a 
powerful disciplinary and accountability mechanism, keeping col-
laborative new governance institutions focused and on track. In the 
Florida Everglades restoration initiative, for example, the lead fed-
eral and state agencies know that failure to deliver on promised im-
provements in water quality and sheet flow to the critically imperiled 
                                                                                                                      
 180. See Arnold, supra note 178, at 48-55. 
 181. See Holly Doremus, Water, Population Growth, and Endangered Species in the West, 
72 U. COLO. L. REV. 361, 361 (2001) (“The link between three highly controversial issues in 
today’s American West, water, urban population growth, and the protection of endangered 
species, has become impossible to ignore. Water, the essential element whose limited avail-
ability defines the West, is the fulcrum of this relationship.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 182. See John M. Volkman, The Endangered Species Act and the Ecosystem of Colum-
bia River Salmon, 4 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 51, 60-61 (1997). 
 183. See, e.g., Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Bay-Delta Accord: A Stride Toward Sustain-
ability, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 356-63 (1996) (describing how the collaborative and adap-
tive CALFED Bay-Delta Program, aimed at coordinating the operations of California’s 
most important water delivery system with downstream water quality, instream flow, and 
habitat restoration needs, was launched in the shadow of possible Endangered Species Act 
and Clean Water Act litigation). 
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south Everglades will almost inevitably be met with citizen suits un-
der the Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species Act, or both, creat-
ing a strong disincentive to backsliding, gamesmanship, or inatten-
tiveness to the task. 
 These examples suggest that future generations of citizen suit 
provisions could be structured with bottom-up destabilization, disen-
trenchment, and penalty default effects in mind, allowing citizen 
suits to be adapted to play a constructive role in the emergence and 
continued operation of new governance regimes, rather than continu-
ing to primarily serve as the handmaiden of conventional command-
and-control regulation, a role for which they are often criticized.184 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 This Article has argued that regulatory penalty default rules can 
play a useful and possibly central role in motivating, structuring, dis-
ciplining, and holding accountable environmental new governance in-
stitutions in the United States. Regulatory penalty default rules—
harsh backstopping rules that form the default position against which 
regulated parties may bargain for alternative, mutually advantageous 
solutions—already play a significant, if masked, role in various areas 
of conventional environmental regulation. Given their information- 
and action-forcing character, regulatory penalty default rules appear 
suitable for adaptation to a new role—creating incentives for parties to 
enter into collaborative new governance arrangements in good faith 
pursuit of environmentally beneficial outcomes to avoid the harsher 
consequences that might follow from failure to do so. 
 This Article has also argued that destabilization rights—a concept 
borrowed from Chuck Sabel and Bill Simon’s work on the new public 
law litigation—can also be adapted to new governance modes of envi-
ronmental regulation. First, destabilization rights might operate as a 
top-down administrative check on local collaborative processes, al-
lowing a central regulatory body to intervene to disentrench local in-
stitutional arrangements that are demonstrably failing to achieve 
stated performance objectives and appear to be suffering process 
failures. Second, destabilization rights might operate through citizen 
suit provisions, allowing bottom-up, citizen-initiated disentrenching 
interventions that destabilize demonstrably failing institutional con-
figurations and thereby create space for consideration of novel alter-
natives. Finally, the mere threat of destabilizing citizen suits can op-
erate as a distinctive kind of penalty default, inducing parties to un-
dertake collaborative new governance initiatives and to keep those 
                                                                                                                      
 184. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Inju-
ries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 221 (1992) (describing citizen suits as “part and 
parcel of a largely unsuccessful system of command-and-control regulation”). 
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initiatives on track to avoid the potentially harsh consequences of 
citizen suit litigation. 
 Both regulatory penalty defaults and destabilization rights are le-
gally enforceable “hard law” ultimately backed by the coercive power 
of the state. Both seek to impose discipline and accountability on 
otherwise reluctant actors. However, neither relies on direct regula-
tory prescription of mandatory rules of behavior, thus avoiding the 
common pitfalls of conventional command-and-control style rules. In-
stead, these rules operate by indirection. Regulatory penalty defaults 
change the baseline for negotiation and make genuine cooperation 
more attractive than shirking or strategic bargaining. Destabiliza-
tion rights authorize interventions that upset established but failing 
institutional arrangements, but because they refrain from prescrib-
ing detailed alternatives, they clear the way for a fresh start search 
for novel solutions. 
 Regulatory penalty defaults and destabilization rights thus go 
some distance toward answering those critics of new governance so-
lutions who question how it is possible to have discipline, account-
ability, and central coordination and oversight, yet avoid the well-
known pathologies of excessively prescriptive command-and-control 
style regulation. 
 
